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Summary findings
To shed light on decentralization in Russia, Freinkman  republics and okrugs  but revenue arrangements differ
and Yossifov examine intergovernmental  fiscal relations  greatly. "True"  decentralization has taken place in
within regions. To analyze trends, they review channels  oblasts and krais, where local authorities are provided
of fiscal allocation within regions - tax sharing and  with a bigger share of subnational tax revenues. A
local transfer schemes. To evaluate the potential impact  redistribution  model applies in republics and
of various fiscal decentralization patterns on regional  autonomous okrugs,  where greater local outlays have
economic performance (including growth and the budget  been financed through  larger transfers from regional
deficit), they study data on the structure of 89 Russian  governments.
consolidated regional budgets for 1992-96.  Regions near each other tend to have similar budget
They find that local governments' relative share of  arrangements - the result of intensive interactions
Russia's consolidated budget, although substantive  between neighbors and probably supported  by the
(roughly a quarter of the total budget), did not expand  activities of regional associations. The size of a region's
after 1994. The federal government's  relative role in  territory does not influence decentralization outcomes.
financing public goods and services declined as the  Fiscal decentralization seems positively related to the
relative role of local governments increased substantially.  share of education spending in regional budgets. And
Local governments collected more revenues in 1996 (6.4  regions with more decentralized finances tend to
percent of GDP) and spent more than regional  experience less economic decline.
governments. They also substantially increased social  But budget control is weaker in more decentralized
financing (including health, education, and social  regions. Instability and lack of transparency in
protection).  intergovernmental  fiscal relations provide subnational
Russia made no progress toward a more transparent  governments little incentive for responsible fiscal policy.
system for tax assignments.  Further decentralization with-out  greater transparency
The average level of expenditure decentralization is  could bring greater debt and deficits.
similar for ethnically Russian regions and national
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1. Introduction
Fiscal  decentralization  in Russia  has been  an important  dimension  of reforms since 1992.  The
issue has received  a lot of attention  recently  in academic  literature  (Lavrov,  1995;  Le Houerou,  1995;
McLure  at al, 1995;  Treisman, 1998a;  Wallich, 1994). As a rule these studies have  been focused  at three
aspects  of evolving  Russian federalism:  delegation  of specific  revenue  and expenditure  assignments  to
regional governments,  relationship  between  federal  and regional  budgets  through  various types of explicit
and implicit  transfers,  and cross-regional  budget  equalization.
The main purpose  of this paper is to look at one more  aspect of the decentralization  process,
which relates to inter-government  fiscal relations  within  the regions. The paper  focuses  on two elements
of such process.  The first reflects overall  trends in allocation  of fiscal  resources  within  regional  fiscal
systems,  primarily  between  regional and municipal  levels  of the government.  We review  both channels  of
fiscal allocation  within  regions -- tax sharing  and local transfer  schemes.  The second element  relates  to
potential impact  of various decentralization  patterns  on regional  economic  performance,  such  as
economic  growth  and budget  deficit. We use the data on the structure  of 89 Russian  consolidated  regional
budgets in 1992-96  to determine  basic statistical  characteristics  of the decentralization  process  over the
period and to provide  correlation  and regression  analysis  of links between  decentralization,  regional
indicators  of social  and industrial structure,  and economic  performance.
Section  2 provides  a brief description  of the data. Section  3 presents  an analytical  framework  used
for developing  a statistical  model. Section  4 reviews  trends in the distribution  of revenue  and expenditure
assignments  between  the federal,  regional and municipal  governments.  Section  5 presents  a more  detailed
analysis  of fiscal decentralization  in Russian  regions  through  the examination  of trends in local
governments'  shares  in main types of consolidated  regional  budget  revenues  and expenditures.  In Section
6, we suggest  simple  indicators  of fiscal decentralization  and subordination  at the regional  level and
conduct  their statistical  analysis.  Finally,  in Section  7 we run a panel-data  regression  analysis  of potential
determinants  of the fiscal decentralization  process.  We also explore  relationships  between  these indicators
and regional  economic  performance.  Section  8 brings  main conclusions.
2. Data
This paper was inspired  by the work of Lavrov  (1  996a), for which a special database  on the
structure  of the Russian  regional  budgets  for 1992-95  was collected'. Dr. Alexei  Lavrov  also shared  with
us the database,  which derives  from the standard  reporting  forms filed by regions  with the federal
Ministry  of Finance.  He also provided  additional  budget  data for 1996.  The database  contains  data on
consolidated  budgets  for each level of subnational  governments  (regions, cities of regional  status, rayons,
cities of rayon status,  rural municipalities)  for all 89 regions. In a sense  we had access  to quite a unique
data set. Systematic  analysis  of local budgets in Russia  and their relationships  with higher  level budgets is
usually  limited  by lack of representative  data. As a result,  the research  is based on small samples  or case
studies (Freinkman  and Titov, 1994;  Mitcheneck,  1997a;  World  Bank, 1998;  Zhuravskaya,  1997).
The data reflect  actual  outcomes  of annual  budget  execution  (i.e. it is not just agreed  budget
allocation).  According  to Russian  budget  accounting  standards,  the data include  both cash and non-cash
components  of the actual  budget  flows, i.e. include  budget  revenues  and expenditures  occurred  e.g.
through barter  or cancellation  of mutual debts. Also,  as is usual for Russian  budget statistics,  subnational
' Some  results  of this  report  were  also  presented  in  the  paper  by Kuznetsova,  Lavrov  and  David  (1997).2
budgets  are separated  and do not include  financial  operations  of municipal  companies  (other  than budget
subsidies  to these companies).
We explored  the database  with a special  focus on decentralization  of consolidated  regional
budgets. The  major differences  in our approach  compared  to the one in Lavrov  (1996a) include:
(a) We consolidated  all types of local governments  (i.e. governments  below  the regional level)  and did not
try to look at any differences  between  them. While budget  mechanisms  in different  types of municipalities
are quite different  (especially  between  major cities and rural rayons  and municipalities),  these differences
are less important  from a decentralization  perspective  compared  to a fundamental  contrast  between
municipalities  in general and regional  administrations.  At the same  time, the size of the consolidated
budget of all municipalities  in each particular  region is usually  determined  by the budgets  of few largest
cities that amount  to 70-80%  of the total. Thus, the share  of all local budgets in the regional  fiscal system
could be considered  as a proxy  for the relative budget  role of the largest  urban municipalities.  As it is
shown below, the latter could  be a potentially important  variable  related  to the economic  performance  of
regions.
(b) We excluded  all interbudgetary  transfers  within  the regions from further  consideration.  Netting  out
interbudgetary  transfers  is important,  because  the direct summation  of total revenues/expenditures  results
in a substantial  double  counting  and to overestimation  of the real amount  of fiscal resources  being
controlled  by local governments.  Because  of a multi-level  structure  of local governments  in Russia, inter-
government  fiscal flows  are quite intensive  and could amount  to 30% of gross (i.e. including  transfers)
total local budget  revenues  (see also Data Appendices).
(c) We excluded  the cities of Moscow  and St. Petersburg,  which have a double status of "region-
municipality"  from the analysis.  Given their weight in the total fiscal flows, such exclusion  may change
substantially  statistical  characteristics  of the sample  and influence  conclusions  of the analysis.
(d) Compared  to the original  work  by Lavrov  (1  996a),  we tried to develop  a more comprehensive
statistical  analysis  of the data, including  cross-regional  variation  of main parameters  and factor analysis  of
decentralization.
(e) Finally,  we have used the data to explore the links between  decentralization  and regional  economic
performance,  which provides  an opportunity  to compare  some conventional  predictions  of the
decentralization  theory with actual  numbers.
Also, we've had an opportunity  to incorporate  the 1996  budget  outcomes into  the database.  Given
considerable  stabilization  efforts in Russia in 1995  such an extension  may provide important  additional
information.  Data on 1996  reflect  some initial  post-stabilization  fiscal realities,  which could  be different
from the trends observed  during  the inflationary  phase of 1992-95.
All data on the federal  budget is based on the reports from the Ministry of Finance  with some
adjustments  done by the staff of the World  Bank (Le Houerou, 1995;  World Bank, 1998)  to incorporate
major types of off-budget  operations  of the central  government.  As usual in this kind of analysis,  we do
not consider  here main extra-budgetary  funds (such as the Pension  fund)  which operate outside  of the
traditional government  budget.
An important  caveat  relates to the quality of the data,  that was affected  by various incentives  of
local governments  to underreport  their budget  revenues  and hide them using all kinds of extrabudgetary
accounts  (World  Bank, 1998).  Still, we believe  that the data quality is sufficient for adequate  evaluation
of prevailing  trends in the subnational  budget  system.3
3. Analytical  framework
Political  and fiscal decentralization  has recently  become  a global  trend  that is widely  considered
to be supportive  of economic  growth  and more  efficient provision  of public services  (Bahl  and Linn,
1992).  These  gains could  derive from informational  advantages  of local governments,  which are better
positioned  to reflect recipients'  preferences  in the process  of service  delivery  as well as from competition
between local governments  (Oates, 1972)2.  Political  dimension  of the decentralization  is also viewed
quite positively  because it facilitates  establishing  and strengthening  of democratic  institutions  (Inman  and
Rubinfeld,  1997).
By conventional  measures  fiscal decentralization  in Russia has been evolving  quite successfully
in 90-es. Consolidated  regional budgets  are now responsible  for about  a half of total budget spending,
while their share amounted  to about 15%  in late 80-es (Freinkman  and Haney, 1997).  However,  given  the
relatively  large size of most Russian  regions, it is not clear if devolution  of functions  from the center to
regions is sufficient  for enjoying  all decentralization  gains mentioned  above.  If most resources  and
functions  are concentrated  within  regional  governments  and not delegated  to the local level, there is a risk
that the single  centralized  state  would be replaced  by numerous  centralized  entities  of smaller  size that
could  neither exploit informational  advantages  nor be seriously  influenced  by competitive  pressures.  In
the latter  case, another  stage of the decentralization  process would  be required  to force regions to share
more  resources  with local governments.
In reality,  the Russian  environment  for decentralization  is characterized  by wide opportunities  for
the regions to decide  almost unilaterally  on specific arrangements  for power  and budget sharing  with
municipalities.  A legal framework  for fiscal  federalism  at the regional  level is quite weak and regional
authorities  have full discretion  not just for determining  a desirable  degree  of centralization  and
redistribution  of fiscal flows but also for frequently  changing  the rules of the game (World  Bank, 1998).
Recent analysis  of various  aspects  of economic  policy conducted  by Russian  regional governments
suggests  high cross-regional  variation  in both chosen strategies  and to-date  outcomes  of economic
development  (Lavrov,  1996b)  as well as in regional governance  regimes  (Mitcheneck,  1997b).  In such an
environment,  it seems quite likely  to expect a substantial  cross-regional  variation  in actual
decentralization  patterns.  Regions  may experiment  with more or less centralized  schemes  depending  on
their political preferences,  specifics  of economic  structure,  and social  and geographical  features.  Given
mentioned  above predictions  of the theory  of fiscal federalism,  one may  expect that the actual degree  of
regional decentralization  would  matter: more  decentralized  regions,  all other  factors equal,  would
demonstrate  stronger  economic  growth  (less decline).
Thus  recent Russian developments  provide  an interesting  statistical  material  - a relatively large
sample of similar government  entities  that have been pursuing  different  decentralization  policies -- to be
tested against some conventional  theoretical  principles.  Traditionally,  impact  of decentralization  on
economic  performance  is studied  based on cross-country  regressions,  which have  their own limitations
related  to high heterogeneity  of the sample  by too many  parameters.  Decentralization  is a complex  multi-
dimensional  process,  and its impact  on economic  performance  is difficult  to isolate from influences  of
various cultural,  political,  and historical  factors.  In this respect,  the sample  of Russian  regions is much
more homogeneous  because,  notwithstanding  existing cross-regional  variation,  all regions  of Russia  have
strong  common  roots in modern  history of the Russian/Soviet  state. This common  cultural  and political
background  may  provide  more chances  for identification  and accurate  statistical  measuring  of links and
correlations  in the sample.
2 Zhang  and  Zou  (1997)  provide  a general  model  for  analyzing  the  impact  of inter-government  and  inter-sectoral
allocation  of  budget  expenditures  on  economic  growth.4
There  are some country-specific  arguments  in support  of a possible  positive link  between  regional
decentralization  and regional growth in Russia.  Recent experience  of the most advanced  countries  in
transition demonstrated  that economic  recovery  and growth  is primarily  concentrated  in the largest  cities
(urban  municipalities)  which is associated  with more favorable  industrial  structure,  better access  to
infrastructure  and human  capital in metropolitan  areas.  But in Russia, local governments  in urban areas  of
potential  economic  growth,  face economic  disincentives  that derive from excessive  and discretionary
centralization  of fiscal gains that such a growth  may bring.
Under current  fiscal arrangements,  the rules of tax sharing  between  the local and regional
governments  are negotiated  annually-or  sometimes  several  times a year. The shares  tend  to be
differentiated  sharply  across municipalities,  with a few largest industrial  centers  often  contributing  large
shares of main taxes,  while rural  rayons  keep 100  percent  and also receive  most of regional  budget
transfers.  The sharing  rates vary not  just between  urban and rural  districts  within  the same oblasts,  but
also between  urban districts in different  oblasts.  In 1993,  the city of Tver  was permitted  to keep 3 percent
of profit  tax revenues,  4.3 percent of VAT,  and 5 percent  of personal  income  tax collected in the city. The
rest went to federal and regional  budgets.  The corresponding  rates for the city of Yaroslavl,  however,
were 12, 10 and 80 percent.  (Institute  for Local Government,  1994)
Research  suggests  that urban municipalities  are punished for better revenue  performance  by
having  their tax shares  lowered.  One study of the budgets of 35 large cities in 29 Russia's regions in
1992-97  found  that for every  ruble that a local budget's own revenues  increased  in a given year,  about 90
kopecks  were taxed away by reductions  in the transfers and tax shares  that the superior  regional
government  allowed  (Zhuravskaya,  1998).  Thus,  any increase  in the effectiveness  of tax collection  or
increase in local revenues  due to growth-promoting  policies would  be unlikely  to make the local
governments  better off than before.
Analysis  of the trends in tax sharing  rates for rayon budgets in Yaroslavl  oblast in 1994-98  also
suggests  that urban municipalities  are the most affected  by the existing  system (World  Bank, 1998).  As in
most other Russian  regions,  all the 12  rural rayons  are recipients  of transfers  within  the regional  budget
system and always have been  getting maximum  possible  tax shares.  In contrast,  all urban  rayons are
facing  a gradual  decline  in their tax share. The rate of this decline  is not monotonic,  influenced  by
bargaining  power of specific  municipal  leaders,  and hardly  could be predicted  in advance  by municipal
authorities.
Overall,  these examples  may suggest  that large urban municipalities  in Russia are the main
beneficiaries  from decentralization  of regional  budgets.  Decentralization  brings  them more resources  and
more incentives  to use them more  efficiently.  While we believe  that in Russia, as in other  countries in
transition,  an average rate of return of budget  spending  is much higher in urban centers,  then
decentralization  may support  growth  through  simple  reallocation  of resources  from less to more efficient
users.3
For further  justification of this argument,  it is necessary  to look at differences  in the structure  of
budget  spending  at various government  levels.  Different  combinations  of investment,  subsidies,  and
social spending  have a different  impact  on economic  growth.  From this perspective,  there is an evidence
that it is regional governments  who are responsible  for most enterprise  subsidies  remained  in the Russian
fiscal system  (Freinkman  and Haney, 1997).  These subsidies  are a serious  barrier  for restructuring  of
recipient  enterprises,  which are usually  the largest local companies  with a sufficient  lobbying  power  to
3 By  the  same  reason,  decentralization,  by reducing  redistribution,  may  lead  to an increase  in fiscal  inequality  across
local  govermments,  especially  between  urban  and  rural  municipalities.5
extract budget funds. It sounds plausible that less decentralized regional fiscal systems (i.e. with a higher
share of regional governments) would tend to have more subsidies, less enterprise restructuring and less
growth.
Recent analysis of the relation between decentralization and growth in developing countries
found, contrary to the theoretical predictions, a negative correlation between these two variables. These
results hold for three different cases: a cross-country model estimated for 46 developing countries
(Davoodi and Zou, 1998), cross-country model for developed and developing countries (Fukasaku and De
Melo, 1997), and cross-provincial model for a specific country, China (Zhang and Zou, 1  998)  4 Several
factors are named that could be responsible for this inconsistency between the theory and the outcome of
statistical analysis. They include: (i) wrong composition of expenditure made by local governments,
which may in part derive from the fact that local governments in many countries are not elected and thus
not responsive to local preferences; (ii) local government autonomy in expenditure decisions may be
limited due to excessive interventions of the central government; in other words, simple measures of
fiscal decentralization based on a share of subnational governments in consolidated budget expenditures
may overestimate actual degree of decentralization; (iii) in some countries (e.g. China) programs of the
central government could be more efficient due to nation-wide externalities associated with large
infrastructure projects and similar types of spending.
While traditionally decentralization and growth were seen as positively correlated, impact of
decentralization on fiscal performance was usually considered as potentially more problematic (Wildasin,
1998). These worries that decentralization may contribute to fiscal imbalance and accumulation of public
debt have become stronger recently (Tanzi, 1996) in part as a reflection of subnational debt crisis in Latin
America (Dillinger and Webb, 1998). However, available theoretical and empirical work does not provide
sufficient support for the validity of these concerns (Hunter and Shah, 1998; Fornasari at al., 1998). In
particular, Wildasin (1997) argues that ultimate impact of the decentralization on fiscal performance is
highly dependent upon basic characteristics of the system of inter-governmental fiscal relations such as
transparency, accountability, and predictability. He also suggests that the size of individual subnational
governments could be of critical importance: some subnational governments are just too large to fail and
have weak incentives for responsible fiscal policy. The latter leads to a higher probability of their default
to be followed by bailout by the central government. Another recent paper (Fornasari at al., 1998), which
was also based on the cross-country analysis, shows that the size of subnational government is positively
correlated with the size of the national budget deficit. However, the paper examines the effect of an
absolute size of subnational governments (as percent of GDP), not their relative size (as percent of the
overall government size), which would be a more appropriate measure of decentralization. Also, these
results still do not address a more a general question - what is the impact of the decentralization on the
overall fiscal performance (consolidated budget deficit)?
From this perspective, it seems interesting to explore the impact of decentralization on fiscal
performance within the sample of Russian regions. Changes in a degree of decentralization lead to
substantive modifications in institutional setting for the budget management. Peculiar features of budget
institutions are likely to bring about changes in fiscal performance (Alesina, 1996). Thus, it is easy to
expect some correlation between decentralization and e.g. size of budget deficit. But what may be a sign
of such correlation? On one side, following Wildasin's  model, one may argue that, given all existing non-
4However,  for India  the same  authors (Zhang  and Zou, 1997)  found  that most measures  of decentralization  are
positively  correlated  with  the state economic  growth.  In both cases,  for China and India,  they consider  a two-level
government  model  with  the municipal  level  being excluded  from analysis.  Also,  the recent  study  by Hunter  and
Shah (1998)  provides  some but very indirect  evidence  of positive  link between  decentralization  and  growth.  They
develop  an index  of good governance  and show  that the index is positively  related  to both decentralization  and
economic  growth.6
transparency  and non-predictability  in budget  relations  between  regional  and municipal  governments,
more decentralized  regions  would have less fiscal discipline  and higher  budget  deficits. On  the other side,
in the Russian  environment,  individual  local governments  have  less access  to capital markets  than
regional  ones because  municipalities  have less control  over their revenue  flow and thus are considered  by
creditors  as more risky. So far, most of subnational  debt and deficit  in Russia  was concentrated  at the
regional  level, which to large  extent reflects restricted  opportunities  of local governments  to attract  deficit
financing  (World  Bank, 1998).  Also, decentralization,  by reducing  the size of regional governments,
effectively  limits their opportunities  to borrow  relatively  to the size of the consolidated  regional  budget.
Thus,  one may expect  that more decentralized  fiscal systems,  in which local governments  control a
relatively larger  portion  of total budget,  would carry  less debt and deficit.
4. Main trends in fiscal decentralization,  1992-96
The legal framework  for local decentralization  is provided  by several  federal laws  that in general
give regional  legislature  almost  unlimited  power for sharing  fiscal resources  with municipalities  (Lavrov,
1996a;  Yandiev, 1997).  There  are two primary channels  for decentralization  of budget funds:  tax sharing
and regional budget  transfer  program  (World  Bank, 1998).  Under current  arrangements,  the shares  of
shared  taxes that each local budget  receives  are negotiated  annually  -- or sometimes  several  times a year -
- between  the local and regional governments.  As mentioned  above,  the shares  tend to be differentiated
sharply  across municipalities.
A specific  feature  of fiscal decentralization  in Russia  relates to a very limited role  of local taxes
in subnational  budgets.  The lion's share, about 75%, of all subnational  tax revenues  derives  from four
major federal taxes  that are shared  on a derivation  basis and neither regional  nor local governments  have
leverage  regarding  tax rates and tax bases of these  taxes. Conflicts  related  to intra-regional  allocation  of
subnational  shares  of main tax between  regional and municipal  governments  constitute  a center  part of the
whole budget  preparation  process.  Local governments  have  very limited room for collecting  more
revenues  through additional  taxation.  In 1996-97,  the single  largest local tax - tax on upkeep  of social
assets  - amounted  to 7-10%  of total budget revenues  in cities  that have used it actively.  However,  the draft
Tax Code provides  for elimination  of this tax (together  with other similar  taxes levied on gross turnover).
At the same  time, insufficient  discretion  of local governments  over their tax sources  does generate  lack of
accountability:  local leaders  may always argue  that higher  levels of government  deprive  them from any
instruments  to increase  revenues  and thus improve  service  delivery.  For local governments  in areas of
potential economic  growth,  the expectation  of punitive  extraction  by the regional  government  creates
incentives  to keep their budget  revenues  hidden.
Anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that the reported  numbers  on the size of municipal  budgets  may
exaggerate  the actual  degree  of regional decentralization.  This caveat  is important  for adequate
interpretation  of the data that follow.  Various  expenditures  could  be nominally  funded  from local budgets
while decisions  on their allocation  may be made at the regional level, with municipalities  merely
executing  regional  government  decisions.  Some regions  have  recently  recentralized  some types of
expenditures,  such as infrastructure  investments.
At least among  regions, which are recipients  of large  amounts  of federal transfers,  regional
authorities  have much  control  over the revenue and expenditure  patterns of municipal  governments.  The
widespread  use of non-cash  schemes  for budget  execution  further  supports  such a trend toward greater
regional control  since schemes  of mutual settlements  enjoy significant  economies  of scale.  However,  this
trend is balanced  to some extent with strengthening  of practice  of local elections  and establishment  of
structures  of local-self  government,  which feel sufficient  popular  support to stand regional  pressures.7
Between 1992  and 1996,  the relative size of the enlarged  Russian  government,  measured  by the
size of its budget,  has shrunk  substantially.  However,  as seen from Tables 1-6,  the observed  downsizing
of the Russian  government  was not similar across  the different  government  levels.
The consolidated  budget  revenues5  of all levels of the government  fell from 33.4%  of GDP in
1992  to 27.2% in 1996  (Table 1). During  that period,  federal government's  total revenues  shrunk  from
20.1%  of GDP  to 14.5%  in 1996,  while subnational  governments  saw little change in the size  of their
revenues  relative  to GDP.  As a result,  by 1996  subnational  governments  controlled  46.5% of consolidated
budget  revenues  net of interbudgetary  transfers,  up from 39.8% in 1992  (Table  2). All this
decentralization  shift happened  in 1992-94,  while in 1995-96  the share  of the federal government
regained  some ground.
The relative share of local governments  in the Russian  consolidated  budget did not expand  much
since 1994  and they remain in control  of about  a quarter  of total budget  expenditures.  However,  at the
subnational  level, the relative size  of the local budgets increased  at the expense  of some compression  in
regional  budgets. 1996  was the first year,  when local governments  collected  more budget  revenues  (6.4%
of GDP)  than regional administrations.
As seen in Table 1, the overall  decline in consolidated  government  revenues  relative  to GDP  can
be largely attributed  to weakening  tax collection.  Between 1992  and 1996,  the consolidated  tax revenues
of all tiers of the government  dropped  from 29.6%  to 23.2%  of GDP. This overall downward  trend was
driven  by two especially  sharp drops  (each in excess of 4.5 percentage  points) in total tax collections  that
occurred  in 1993  and 1995.  The systemic  problems  created  by the transition  to a market economy
substantially  eroded  the collection  base of many taxes. At the same  time, tax administration  in Russia  has
been  traditionally  weak. 6
In 1996,  overall budget  revenues  from the Profit Tax were only 4.6% of GDP, compared  to 8.2%
in 1992.  The VAT receipts  relative  to GDP also dived  from 10.5%  to 7.5% in 1996.  The reassertion  of
property  rights however,  boosted  the revenues  from Property Taxes  and their volume has been steadily
rising to reach 1.7%  of GDP in 1996.  Over this period, cumulative  non-tax  revenues  - including
privatization  receipts -failed to increase  relative  to GDP. In 1996,  they summed  up to 4% of GDP -a
small improvement  compared  to their 1992  value of 3.7%.
The trends of revenue  sharing  between  the three tiers of government  were quite different  for the
various  types of main taxes (Table  2). Throughout  the period,  local governments'  share in VAT  has been
fairly stable (around 10%),  while  their allotments  of the Profit Tax and the Personal  Income  Tax revenues
have  fallen by 3.6 and 10.9  percentage  points respectively.  Between  1992  and 1996,  regional
governments  enhanced  their share in Profit Tax revenues  by '8.3 percentage  points, while broadly
preserving  their shares of the Personal  Income  Tax and the VAT - 24.6%  and 15.7%  in 1996  respectively.
5Calculated  as the  sum  of total  revenues  of  the  three  tiers  of govermment  net  of all  budgetary  transfers  from  one
government  level  to another.
6 Treisman  (1998b)  provides  detailed  analysis  of factors  responsible  for  poor  tax  performance.Table 1. Budget  Revenues  by Level  of Government  as Percent  of GDP, %
BudgetRevenues  IYear  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Total  Revenues  37.30  36.71  36.96  31.52  32.58
- federal  20.34  14.51  14.43  14.24  14.56
- regional  8.32  11.23  11.98  8.80  8.75
- local  8.64  10.97  10.55  8.48  9.27
Total Revenues  Net  of
Interbudgetary Transfers  33.38  N/A  30.08  27.03  27.18
- federal  20.08  14.49  14.19  14.16  14.54
- regional  7.02  9.67  8.23  6.89  6.24
- local  6.27  N/A  7.66  5.98  6.40
Transfers  from Other Levels  of
Government  3.93  N/A  6.89  4.49  5.40
- federal  0.26  0.02  0.24  0.08  0.02
- regional  1.30  1.55  3.75  1.91  2.51
- local  2.37  N/A  2.90  2.50  2.87
Total  Tax  Revenues  29.64  25.13  26.85  22.23  23.21
- federal  17.87  11.46  12.97  10.76  11.56
- regional  5.76  7.12  7.08  5.82  5.50
- local  6.00  6.55  6.81  5.65  6.15
Profit Tax  8.23  9.81  8.02  7.16  4.58
- federal  3.40  3.19  2.81  2.55  1.68
- regional  2.48  3.90  3.12  2.79  1.76
- local  2.35  2.72  2.09  1.82  1.14
VAT  10.52  6.57  6.83  5.84  7.46
- federal  7.90  4.23  4.59  4.40  5.58
- regional  1.59  1.48  1.44  0.82  1.17
- local  1.03  0.86  0.80  0.62  0.71
Personal  Income Tax  2.27  2.56  2.87  2.23  2.55
- federal  0  0  0.02  0.20  0.23
- regional  0.52  0.59  0.74  0.54  0.63
- local  1.75  1.97  2.11  1.49  1.69
Excise  Taxes  1.10  1.04  1.22  1.48  2.85
- federal  0.53  0.52  0.73  1.08  2.47
- regional  0.46  0.42  0.39  0.31  0.29
- local  0.11  0.10  0.10  0.09  0.08
Property  Taxes  0.28  0.32  0.79  1.03  1.67
- federal  0  0  0  0.05  0.01
- regional  0.15  0.15  0.33  0.43  0.74
- local  0.14  0.17  0.46  0.54  0.92
Natural Resources  Tax  0.64  0.50  0.40  0.75  1.02
- federal  0  0.14  0.06  0.18  0.26
- regional  0.41  0.20  0.18  0.27  0.40
- local  0.23  0.15  0.16  0.30  0.37
OtherTaxes  6.59  4.34  6.72  3.75  3.09
- federal  6.04  3.37  4.75  2.30  1.33
- regional  0.15  0.39  0.88  0.65  0.51
- local  0.39  0.58  1.09  0.80  1.24
Non-Tax  Revenues  3.74  N/A  3.22  4.81  3.96
- federal  2.21  3.03  1.22  3.41  2.98
- regional  1.26  2.55  1.15  1.07  0.75
- local  0.27  N/A  0.85  0.34  0.249
The single  most important  development  throughout  the period,  was the federal government's
reclaim  of sizable  portions of the Excise Taxes  and the Natural  Resources  Tax.  While in 1992,  the federal
government  received  47.9%  of the Excise Taxes  and none of the Natural Resources  Taxes,  by 1996  the
federal shares  in these  taxes have risen to 86.8%  and 25.1%  respectively.
Table 3 shows the relative  roles of various  types of revenues  in the financing  of local,  regional
and federal  budgets.  The data reveals  a serious  cross-government  disparity  between  the portions  of total
revenues  derived  from the four main shared  taxes 7 and the other  taxes. Between  1992  and 1996,  the
combined  share of the Profit Tax, VAT,  Personal  Income  Tax and Excises  in total revenues  of local and
regional  governments  declined  by 21.7 and 16.8  percentage  points respectively.  In 1996,  these four main
taxes accounted  for 39.1%  of local and 44% of regional  total revenues.  In contrast,  at the federal  level the
portion  of total revenues  derived  from the four main taxes increased  from 58.1% in 1992  to 68.4%  in
1996.  At the same  time, the corresponding  shares of Property Taxes  grew more  than four times (to 8.4%
of the total) at regional and six times (to 9.9%) at the local government  level. Share  of other  taxes
declined  at the federal  level (where they mainly represent  foreign  trade taxes)  but increased  at the
subnational  level (where they  represent  numerous  small  taxes and fees, which frequently  are region
specific).
One possible  explanation  of this phenomenon  is that subnational  governments  have almost  no
control  over the rates and the tax base of shared  tax revenues  assigned  to them and therefore  they do not
have leverage  to push for expansion  in collection  of these taxes. In addition,  because  of the shared  nature
of these taxes,  subnational  governments  have limited incentives  to strengthen  tax administration  for main
taxes. Consequently,  one of the few ways in which subnational  governments  can independently  raise
more revenues  is through more active  involvement  in the collection  of local taxes,  first of all the Property
and the Land Taxes.  From the other  hand, it is the federal government  who controls  the assignment  of
shares from the shared taxes  to the lower  levels of government,  but has few alternative  sources  of tax
receipts.  As a result,  in response  to growing  fiscal pressures,  the federal government  tends to make
regular  changes  in tax sharing  and increase  its share in four main shared taxes.
On the expenditure  side, the consolidated  expenditures 8 of all levels of the government  fell from
51.6% of GDP  in 1992  to 35.3% in 1996  (Table 4). It is worth mentioning  that the magnitude  of this
decline in government  spending  was more  than twice the size of the negative  shocks  experienced  on the
revenue  side of government  budgets.  Thus,  the shrinkage  of the Russian  government  was driven  not only
by the government's  sheer inability  to generate  tax revenues,  but also by a considerable  stabilization
effort by the Russian  government.  In 1996,  the enlarged  government  experienced  a moderate  expansion  as
the share of consolidated  budget  expenditures  in GDP increased  by 4.1 percentage  points.
The government  expenditure  items  most adversely  affected  by this scaling  down  were those of
"National  Economy"  and "Defense".  The outlays  on "National  Economy"  - including  subsidies  to
enterprises  and housing  - decreased  from 26.4%  of GDP in 1992  to 8.6% in 1996,  while the defense
expenditures  dropped  by 1 percentage  point.  Throughout  the period,  overall  budget  expenditures  on
"Education",  "Health  and Sports"  and "Culture  and Mass Media" as percent  of GDP remained  fairly
stable  around  their 1992  levels.
7The  Profit  Tax,  the  VAT,  the  Personal  Income  Tax  and  Excise  Taxes  that  together  provide  about  75%  of total  tax
revenues  of the  consolidated  budget.
Calculated  as  the sum  of  total  expenditures  of  the  three  tiers  of government  net  of all  transfers  from  one
government  level  to another.10
Table 2. Shares of Different Government Levels in Consolidated
Itemized Revenues, %
Budget  Revenues  /Year  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Total Revenues  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  54.5  39.5  39.0  45.2  44.7
- regional  22.3  30.6  32.4  27.9  26.9
- local  23.2  29.9  28.5  26.9  28.5
Total  Revenues  Net  of
Interbudgetary  Transfers  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  60.2  N/A  47.2  52.4  53.5
- regional  21.0  N/A  27.4  25.5  23.0
- local  18.8  N/A  25.5  22.1  23.5
Transfers  from  OtherLevels  of
Government  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  6.6  N/A  3.5  1.7  0.33
- regional  33.1  N/A  54.4  42.6  46.4
- local  60.3  N/A  42.1  55.7  53.2
Total  Tax Revenues  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  60.3  45.6  48.3  48.4  49.8
- regional  19.4  28.3  26.4  26.2  23.7
- local  20.3  26.1  25.3  25.4  26.5
Profit  Tax  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  41.3  32.5  35.1  35.6  36.6
- regional  30.1  39.7  38.9  39.0  38.4
- local  28.6  27.7  26.1  25.4  25.0
VAT  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  75.1  64.4  67.2  75.4  74.8
- regional  15.1  22.5  21.1  14.0  15.7
- local  9.8  13.1  11.7  10.6  9.5
Personal  Income  Tax  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  0  0  0.6  9.0  9.2
- regional  22.8  23.2  25.8  24.2  24.6
- local  77.2  76.8  73.6  66.8  66.3
Excise  Taxes  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  47.9  50.5  60.1  72.8  86.8
- regional  41.9  40.2  32.0  21.3  10.3
- local  10.2  9.3  7.9  5.8  2.9
Property  Taxes  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  0  0  0  5.0  0.8
- regional  52.4  45.5  41.8  42.3  44.1
- local  47.6  54.5  58.2  52.8  55.1
Natural  Resources  Tax  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  0  29.1  15.3  24.4  25.1
- regional  63.9  40.6  44.9  36.4  39.0
- local  36.1  30.3  39.7  39.2  35.9
OtherTaxes  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  91.8  77.8  70.7  61.3  43.1
- regional  2.3  8.9  13.1  17.3  16.6
- local  5.9  13.3  16.2  21.4  40.2
Non-Tax  Revenues  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  59.3  N/A  38.0  70.9  75.1
- regional  33.6  N/A  35.7  22.2  18.8
- local  7.1  N/A  26.3  7.0  6.111
Table 3. Shares of Itemized Revenues in Total Revenues
at Different Levels of the Government, %
Budget  Revenues  / Year  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Transfers  from  OtherLevels of
Govemment  10.53  N/A  18.63  14.24  16.57
- federal  1.28  0.12  1.67  0.55  0.12
- regional  15.64  13.84  31.30  21.73  28.66
- local  27.41  N/A  27.46  29.45  31.00
Total Tax Revenues  79.45  68.46  72.65  70.52  71.26
- fderal  87.84  79.00  89.85  75.54  79.43
- regional  69.26  63.41  59.09  66.17  62.81
- local  69.51  59.68  64.50  66.59  66.39
Profit  Tax  22.07  26.72  21.71  22.70  14.05
- federal  16.71  21.99  19.49  17.88  11.51
- regional  29.79  34.71  26.04  31.74  20.10
- local  27.26  24.80  19.83  21.42  12.33
VAT  28.21  17.88  18.46  18.53  22.89
- fIderal  38.82  29.14  31.80  30.93  38.33
- regional  19.15  13.15  12.00  9.32  13.37
- local  11.94  7.84  7.57  7.29  7.63
Personal Income Tax  6.08  6.98  7.77  7.06  7.83
-federal  0  0  0.12  1.41  1.61
-regional  6.23  5.29  6.20  6.12  7.16
- local  20.26  17.94  20.03  17.54  18.24
Excise Taxes  2.96  2.83  3.31  4.68  8.73
- federal  2.60  3.61  5.09  7.55  16.97
-regional  5.55  3.72  3.27  3.58  3.34
- local  1.30  0.88  0.92  1.01  0.89
Property  Taxes  0.76  0.87  2.14  3.26  5.12
- federal  0  0  0  0.36  0.09
-regional  1.79  1.29  2.76  4.93  8.41
- local  1.56  1.58  4.37  6.39  9.92
Natural  Resoumres  Tax  1.72  1.35  1.08  2.39  3.14
- federal  0  1.00  0.42  1.29  1.76
- regional  4.92  1.80  1.50  3.11  4.56
- local  2.68  1.37  1.50  3.48  3.96
OtherTaxes  17.65  11.82  18.17  11.88  9.49
- federal  29.70  23.26  32.92  16.12  9.16
- regional  1.84  3.46  7.33  7.36  5.88
- local  4.51  5.26  10.31  9.46  13.42
Non-Tax Revenues  10.02  N/A  8.72  15.25  12.17
- federal  10.89  20.88  8.48  23.91  20.45
-regional  15.10  22.75  9.61  12.10  8.53
- local  3.09  N/A  8.05  3.96  2.6112
The observed  downsizing  of the government  varied across  the different  levels of administration.
While  federal government  expenditures  shrunk  from 39.2%  of GDP in 1992  to 19.6%  in 1996,
expenditures  of regional and municipal  governments  rose by 1.8 and 1.5  percentage  points of GDP
respectively.  As a result,  by 1996  subnational  governments  accounted  for 44.6% of consolidated  public
expenditures  net of interbudgetary  transfers  (Table 5). Throughout  the whole period,  the overall size of
the local government  tier exceeded  that of the regional  one. Between  1992  and 1996,  the share of local
governments  in consolidated  budget  expenditures  net of interbudgetary  transfers  rose from 14.9%  to
26.2%,  while  the corresponding  regional  share increased  from 9.1% to 18.4%.
While quite substantive,  the relative  size of local budgets in Russia  did not expand  since 1994.
Local governments  have been responsible  for about  a quarter of the consolidated  budget  expenditures  (net
of transfers)  and for more  than a half of total subnational  budget  expenditures.  At the same time, the
relative  role of local governments  has been substantially  increasing  in financing  of social sectors,
including  education,  health, and social  protection.  With a growing  share of federal  budget spent on debt
service,  the role of the federal government  in financing  public goods  and services  increasingly  becomes
less important.
This process  of fiscal decentralization  brought a swift change  in the proportions  of itemized
expenditures,  financed  by the different  levels of government.  Between  1992  and 1996,  the federal
government's  share in spending  on "National  Economy"  fell from 80.8%  to 27.5% (Table 5). At the same
time, since 1994  local governments  have become  the biggest  spenders  on this expenditure  item and by
1996  their share in total outlays  on "National  Economy"  was in excess of 40%. As seen in Table 6,
throughout  the whole period local  governments  consistently  allocated  more than 35% of their budgets  on
subsidies.  This makes  the category  "National  Economy"  their number  one spending  priority,  which
relates  to continuing  pressures  for subsidies  in housing  that is a sector  under municipal  responsibility.
Regional  governments  have been  spending  on subsidies  relatively  less than municipalities  but still the
largest  part (about 30%) of their budgets.  However,  recipients  of regional  subsidies  are quite different
from those who are subsidized  by municipalities.  Regional  budgets subsidize  primarily  the largest  local
industrial  enterprises  as well as traditional  former  state farms in agriculture.  Therefore  regional subsidies
are considered  to be more  distortive  as they have  a stronger  negative  impact  on economic  restructuring
and growth (Freinkman  and Haney, 1997).
"Social  Protection"  was one of the few spheres  of public expenditures  that modestly  expanded  as a
share of GDP over the years. The 0.7 percentage  points increase  was accompanied  by a dramatic
downward  shift of expenditure  responsibilities.  Over the period,  local governments  share in consolidated
budget expenditures  on "Social  Protection"  jumped from 7.8% in 1992  to 42% in 1996.
Regional  and local governments  further increased  their involvement  in spheres  that they have
traditionally  dominated.  Between 1992  and 1996,  local governments'  share in consolidated  budget
expenditures  on "Education"  rose by more  than 15 percentage  points to reach 67.5% in 1996.  This
expenditure  item was the second  largest  in local budgets after outlays  on "National  Economy"  and
accounted  for more than one quarter  of their spending  (Table 6).13
Table  4. Budget  Expenditures  by Level of Government  as Percent  of GDP, %
BudgetExpenditures/Year  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Total Expenditures  56.06  46.14  46.14  36.06  40.98
- federal  40.91  25.10  24.24  18.45  22.17
- regional  7.38  10.51  11.71  9.08  9.42
- local  7.77  10.54  10.20  8.53  9.40
Total  Expenditures  Net  of
Interbudgetary  Transfers  51.63  NIA  38.64  31.19  35.30
- federal  39.24  22.53  20.39  16.31  19.57
- regional  4.70  N/A  8.15  6.52  6.49
- local  7.69  10.19  10.10  8.36  9.23
Transfers  to OtherLevels  of
Government  4.43  N/A  7.51  4.87  5.68
- federal  1.67  2.57  3.84  2.14  2.59
- regional  2.68  N/A  3.56  2.56  2.92
- local  0.08  0.35  0.10  0.17  0.16
NationalEconomy  26.42  13.45  10.60  8.34  8.56
- federal  21.35  6.53  3.22  2.20  2.35
- regional  2.31  3.31  3.68  2.96  2.77
- local  2.76  3.61  3.70  3.19  3.43
Education  3.58  4.06  4.51  3.48  3.82
- federal  1.21  0.79  0.90  0.55  0.56
- regional  0.52  0.77  0.86  0.69  0.69
- local  1.85  2.50  2.75  2.24  2.58
Health  and Sport  2.47  3.11  3.25  2.37  2.61
- federal  0.28  0.33  0.38  0.23  0.27
- regional  0.70  0.94  1.08  0.79  0.86
- local  1.49  1.85  1.78  1.35  1.48
Social Protection  1.08  0.74  0.78  1.28  1.76
- federal  0.77  0.38  0.39  0.24  0.55
- regional  0.22  0.26  0.27  0.40  0.47
- local  0.08  0.10  0.12  0.64  0.74
Administration  and Justice  1.84  2.32  2.96  2.40  2.78
- federal  1.48  1.85  2.41  1.51  1.77
- regional  0.10  0.14  0.18  N/A  0.53
- local  0.26  0.33  0.37  N/A  0.48
Culture and Mass  Media  0.61  0.57  0.73  0.55  0.59
- federal  0.31  0.20  0.29  0.17  0.21
- regional  0.13  0.17  0.21  0.17  0.17
- local  0.17  0.20  0.23  0.21  0.21
Defence  4.50  4.20  4.67  3.04  3.47
- federal  4.50  4.20  4.67  3.04  3.47
- regional  0  0  0  0  0
- local  0  0  0  0  0
Loans  5.04  N/A  2.72  0.99  0.91
- federal  4.61  1.70  2.30  0.58  0.28
- regional  0.20  N/A  0.34  0.34  N/A
- local  0.23  N/A  0.08  0.06  N/A
OtherExpenditures  6.09  N/A  8.42  8.73  10.78
- federal  4.72  6.55  5.83  7.77  10.12
- regional  0.52  N/A  1.51  N/A  N/A
- local  0.85  N/A  1.08  N/A  N/A14
Table 5. Shares of Different Government Levels in Consolidated
Itemized Expenditures, %
Budget  Expenditures  / Year  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Total Expenditures  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  73.0  54.4  52.5  51.1  54.1
- regional  13.2  22.8  25.4  25.2  23.0
- local  13.9  22.8  22.1  23.7  22.9
Total Expenditures  Net  of
Interbudgetary  Transfers  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  76.0  N/A  52.8  52.3  55.4
- regional  9.1  N/A  21.1  20.9  18.4
- local  14.9  N/A  26.1  26.8  26.2
Transfers  to OtherLevels  of
Government  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  37.6  N/A  51.2  43.9  45.7
- regional  60.5  N/A  47.5  52.6  51.5
- local  1.8  N/A  1.3  3.5  2.9
National  Economy  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  80.8  48.6  30.4  26.3  27.5
- regional  8.7  24.6  34.8  35.4  32.4
- local  10.5  26.8  34.9  38.2  40.1
Education  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  33.8  19.5  19.9  15.9  14.5
- regional  14.5  18.9  19.1  19.7  18.0
- local  51.8  61.6  61.0  64.4  67.5
Health and Sport  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  11.3  10.5  11.8  9.9  10.2
- regional  28.5  30.2  33.4  33.4  33.1
- local  60.2  59.3  54.8  56.7  56.8
Social Protection  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  71.8  52.0  50.3  18.5  31.2
- regional  20.4  34.9  34.9  31.1  26.8
- local  7.8  13.2  14.8  50.3  42.0
Administration And Justice  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  80.5  79.6  81.4  63.1  63.7
- regional  5.5  6.1  6.2  N/A  19.0
- local  14.0  14.3  12.4  N/A  17.3
Culture and Mass  Media  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  51.2  34.8  39.6  31.6  34.7
- regional  21.2  30.2  28.9  30.8  29.3
- local  27.6  35.0  31.5  37.6  36.0
Defence  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  100  100  100  100  100
- regional  0  0  0  0  0
- local  0  0  0  0  0
Loans  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  91.5  N/A  84.6  58.9  30.3
- regional  4.0  N/A  12.5  34.6  N/A
- local  4.5  N/A  3.0  6.5  N/A
Other  Expenditures  100  100  100  100  100
- federal  77.5  N/A  69.2  89  94
- regional  8.5  N/A  18.0  N/A  N/A
- local  14.0  N/A  12.8  N/A  N/A15
Table 6. Shares of Itemized Expenditures in Total Expenditures
at Different Levels of the Government, %
Budget Expenditures  / Year  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Transfers to Other Levels  of
Government  7.9  N/A  16.3  13.5  13.9
-federal  4.1  10.2  15.9  11.6  11.7
- regional  36.3  N/A  30.4  28.2  31.1
- local  1.0  3.3  1.0  2.0  1.7
National Economy  47.1  29.1  23.0  23.1  20.9
-federal  52.2  26.0  13.3  11.9  10.6
-regional  31.3  31.5  31.4  32.6  29.5
- local  35.5  34.2  36.2  37.4  36.5
Education  6.4  8.8  9.8  9.6  9.3
- federal  3.0  3.2  3.7  3.0  2.5
-regional  7.0  7.3  7.3  7.5  7.3
- local  23.8  23.8  27.0  26.2  27.4
Health  and Sport  4.4  6.7  7.0  6.6  6.4
- federal  0.7  1.3  1.6  1.3  1.2
- regional  9.5  8.9  9.3  8.7  9.2
- local  19.1  17.5  17.4  15.8  15.8
Social Protection  1.9  1.6  1.7  3.5  4.3
- federal  1.9  1.5  1.6  1.3  2.5
- regional  3.0  2.4  2.3  4.4  5.0
- local  1.1  0.9  1.1  7.5  7.9
Administration  And Justice  3.3  5.0  6.4  6.7  6.8
- federal  3.6  7.4  9.9  8.2  8.0
- regional  1.4  1.3  1.6  N/A  5.6
-local  3.3  3.2  3.6  N/A  5.1
Culture and Mass Media  1.1  1.2  1.6  1.5  1.4
- federal  0.8  0.8  1.2  0.9  0.9
-regional  1.7  1.6  1.8  1.9  1.8
- local  2.2  1.9  2.3  2.4  2.3
Defence  8.0  9.1  10.1  8.4  8.5
- federal  11.0  16.8  19.3  16.5  15.7
-regional  0  0  0  0  0
-local  0  0  0  0  0
Loans  9.0  N/A  5.9  2.8  2.2
- federal  11.3  6.8  9.5  3.2  1.2
- regional  2.7  N/A  2.9  3.8  N/A
- local  2.9  N/A  0.8  0.8  N/A
Other Expenditures  10.9  N/A  18.3  24.2  26.3
-federal  11.5  26.1  24.1  42.1  45.7
- regional  7.0  N/A  12.9  N/A  N/A
- local  11.0  N/A  10.6  N/A  N/A16
We next turn to Tables 7 and 8, which present data on the size of budget deficits/surpluses for
different government levels.
Table 7. Budget Balance by Level of Government as Percent of GDP, on a Cash Basis
Budget  Balance  / Year  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Consolidated  Budget  Balance  -18.77  -9.43  -9.18  -4.54  -8.41
- federal  -20.56  -10.59  -9.80  -4.21  -7.61
- consolidated  regional  1.79  1.15  0.62  -0.34  -0.80
-regional  0.93  0.72  0.27  -0.28  -0.67
- local  0.86  0.43  0.35  -0.05  -0.13
Table 8. Budget Balance before Transfers by Level of Government as Percent of GDP,
on a Cash Basis
Budget  Balance / Year  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Consolidated  Budget  Balance  -18.77  -9.43  -9.18  -4.54  -8.41
- federal  -19.15  -8.04  -6.20  -2.15  -5.03
- consolidated  regional  0.39  -1.40  -2.98  -2.40  -3.37
-regional  2.31  N/A  0.08  0.37  -0.25
- local  -1.42  N/A  -2.44  -2.38  -2.84
Between 1992 and 1996, the federal budget deficit, measured on a cash basis, fell from 20.6% of
GDP in 1992 to 7.6% in 1996. At the same time, subnational governments have succeeded to maintain
cash budget surpluses up to 1995,  when both local and regional governments run into deficits. In 1996,
local governments deficit as percent of GDP stood at 0.1  %, whereas the corresponding figure on regional
level was 0.7%.
5. Decentralization at the regional level
This section is focused on the distribution of tax assignments and expenditure responsibilities
between local and regional governments in Russian regions. In contrast to the previous section that
analyses relative shares of three government levels, tables below describe a relative role of local
governments in consolidated regional budgets, i.e. excluding the federal level.
Table 9 presents average values of local governments'  shares in the four main shared taxes: the
Profit Tax, the VAT, the PIT and Excises, together with selected summary statistics for the period 1992-
96. Over this period the collective share of these four taxes in local governments'  total tax revenues fell
from 87.4% in 1992 to 58.9% in 1996.17
Table 9. Shares  of Local  Governments  in Total Consolidated  Regional  Revenues
and in Select  Consolidated  Regional  Tax Revenues, %
Summary  Statistics  /Year  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
1. Share  in  Total  Consolidated  Regional  Revenues  *
1.1.  Mean  66.59  N/A  62.37  67.83  70.25
(1.44)  N/A  (1.18)  (1.27)  (1.43)
1.2.  Standarddeviation  13.24  N/A  10.73  11.7  13.02
1.3.  Coefflicient  ofvariation  0.20  N/A  0.17  0.17  0.19
1.4.  Minimum  vakhe  15.73  N/A  26.81  22.76  11.96
1.5.  Maximum  value  98.02  N/A  85.35  97.76  96.69
1.6.  Vafid  Number  of Observations  85  N/A  83  85  83
2. Share  in  Profit  Tax revenues
2.1. Mean  62.51  56.48  57.40  55.79  55.77
(2.13)  (2.02)  (2.16)  (2.23)  (2.25)
2.2. Standard  deviation  19.68  18.63  19.90  20.58  20.66
2.3. Coefficient  ofvariation  0.31  0.33  0.35  0.37  0.37
2.4. Mininum  value  22.82  21.08  21.59  19.70  7.28
2.5. Maximum  value  99.99  100  100  100  100
2.6. Vaid Number  of Observations  85  85  85  85  84
3. Share  in  VAT  revenues
3.1. Mean  53.82  51.75  49.06  58.15  55.71
(3.32)  (2.96)  (2.85)  (3.21)  (2.82)
3.2. Standard  deviation  30.46  27.13  26.00  27.40  26.00
3.3. Coefficient  ofvariation  0.57  0.52  0.53  0.47  0.47
3.4. Minimum  value  0  0  0  0  0
3.5. Maximumvalue  100  100  100  100  100
3.6. Valid  number  ofobservations  84  84  83  73  85
4. Share in  Personal  Income  Tax  revenues
4.1. Mean  . 85.00  88.33  87.37  87.76  88.68
(1.9)  (1.74)  (1.8)  (1.81)  (1.74)
4.2. Standard  deviation  17.20  15.99  16.63  16.42  15.93
4.3. Coefficientofvariation  0.20  0.18  0.19  0.19  0.18
4.4. Minimm  vakle  40.75  46.61  40.10  40.70  42.20
4.5. Maximurnvahle  100  100  100  100  100
4.6. Valid  numnber  of observations  82  84  85  82  84
5. Share  in  Excise  Tax  revenues
5.1.  Mean  32.95  36.25  41.78  45.5  46.19
(3.96)  (3.83)  (3.99)  (3.95)  (4.16)
5.2. Standard  deviation  36.08  34.88  35.94  35.8  37.64
5.3.  Coefticientofvariation  1.09  0.96  0.86  0.79  0.81
5.4.  Minimum  value  0  0  0  0  0
5.5.  Maxinumvalue  100  100  100  100  100
5.6. Valid  number  ofobservations  83  83  81  82  82
Standard  error of the mean in parentheses.
The cities of Moscow  and St. Petersburg,  Chechnya  and Ingushetia  excluded  from the sample.
* Calculated  as a ratio of the sum of the total revenues  of all tiers of local government  minus  the revenues
from transfers  from one local government  to another  and the sum of the total  revenues  of local  and regional
governments  minus  the transfers  from regions  to local governments  and from local governments  to regions.18
The average  share of local governments  in Profit Tax proceeds  decreased  by 6.7 percentage
points between  1992  and 1996.  This was caused  by an one-time,  permanent  fall in its value in 1993,  after
which the average  share of local governments  in Profit Tax revenues  stabilized  at the new lower level
around 56%.
Over  the same  period,  the average  share  of local governments  in VAT  revenues  was quite
volatile.  Until 1995,  it followed  a downward  trend dropping  by more  than 4.7 percentage  points, only to
regain grounds  in 1995  and fall slightly in the next  year. Overall,  despite  the nominal gain  of 1.9
percentage  points, the 1992  and 1996  average  shares  of local governments  in VAT are not statistically
different  at the 95% level of confidence.  Meanwhile,  the cross-regional  disparities  in the share of VAT
revenues  assigned  to local governments  diminished,  as evidenced  by 10  percentage  point  drop in the
value  of the  respective  coefficient  of variation.  Despite  this tendency,  the variation  in VAT sharing  rates
remained  higher  compared  to those for the Profit Tax  and the PIT, i.e. municipal  VAT shares  still fell into
a maximum band - from zero to one hundred  percent.
The average  share of local governments  in Personal  Income Tax  revenues  increased  by 3.7
percentage  points in 1992-96.  This was caused  by one-time  rise in its value in 1993,  after which  the
average  share of local governments  in the PIT stabilized  at around  88%. It is worth noting  that the timing
of this one-time  jump in the local share of the PIT coincided  with the fall in their share in the Profit Tax.
Regional  disparities  in the allocation  of the PIT were the smallest  among  the main  taxes and the
respective  coefficient  of variation  remained  stable  over the period at 0.19,  which suggests  quite stable
rules of sharing  for this tax.
Compared  to other main taxes, local  governments  experienced  the largest  expansion  in their share
of excises  (by more  than 13  percentage  points).  However,  cross-regional  allocation  of excises  still
remained  the most diversified.  In a number  of regions  municipalities  get nothing  or a negligible  portion  of
excises.
On the expenditure  side, Table 10 presents  data on the average  local governments  shares in four
of the most important  expenditure  items, which collectively  accounted  for more  than 87%  of total
municipal  outlays  in 1996.
The visual inspection  of Table 10 reveals  that with the exception  of the "Health  and Sports"
9 category,  local governments'  involvement  in public  expenditures  has uniformly  grown  over time9.
Overall,  cross regional  variation  in expenditure  sharing  is much lower  that the one for taxes.  It means  that
patterns in expenditure  allocation  are much  more similar in various  regions compared  to revenue
allocation,  which seems  much more  unstable  from tax to tax and from year to year.
Between 1992  and 1996,  the average  share of local governments  in consolidated  regional
expenditures  on "National  Economy"  has increased  by 3.9 percentage  points.
9 The differences in the means of the three variables in 1992 and 1996 are statistically significant at the 95% level of
confidence  in paired-samples  t-tests  of the  equality  of  the  respective  means.19
Table 10. Shares  of Local Governments  in Total Consolidated  Regional  Expenditures
and in Select  Consolidated  Regional  Expenditures,  %
Summary  Statistics  /Year  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
1. Share in Total Consolidated  Regional  Expenditures  *
1.1. Mean  63.93  N/A  63.51  67.32  68.97
(1.31)  N/A  (1.08)  (1.09)  (1.17)
1.2. Standard deviation  12.12  N/A  9.86  10.03  10.83
1.3. Coefflicientofvariation  0.19  N/A  0.16  0.15  0.16
1.4. Minimunvalue  14.91  N/A  26.81  33.34  36.59
1.5. Maximm value  83.94  N/A  84.27  88.30  90.71
2. Share in expenditures  on National Econony
2.1. Mean  61.89  59.29  62.92  64.74  65.79
(1.71)  (1.79)  (1.73)  (1.5)  (1.69)
2.2. Standard  deviation  15.77  16.54  15.94  13.87  15.60
2.3. Coefficient  ofvariation  0.25  0.28  0.25  0.21  0.24
2.4. Mifninmvalue  21.96  18.33  16.25  27.76  28.25
2.5. Maximum  value  89.98  100  100  90.49  93.72
3. Share in  expenditures  on Education
3.1. Mean  85.56  85.14  87.26  86.06  87.59
(0.77)  (0.8)  (0.76)  (0.81)  (0.71)
3.2. Standard deviation  7.11  7.36  6.98  7.45  6.54
3.3. Coefficient  ofvariation  0.08  0.09  0.08  0.09  0.07
3.4. Minimumvalue  55.98  53.56  59.05  50.98  59.24
3.5. Maxinmunvalue  95.78  100  100  94.64  96.50
4.  Share in expenditures  on Health  and Sports
4.1. Mean  69.94  69.98  69.41  69.24  68.68
(1.41)  (1.44)  (1.53)  (1.4)  (1.47)
4.2. Standard deviation  13.00  13.30  14.10  12.88  13.53
4.3. Coefflicientofvariation  0.19  0.19  0.20  0.19  0.20
4.4. Minirnunvalue  17.91  17.26  18.40  18.20  13.33
4.5. Maxun  umvalue  88.16  100  100  90.54  92.18
5. Share in expenditures  on Social Protection
5.1. Mean  22.34  26.31  30.77  67.46  70.79
(2.17)  (2.36)  (2.2)  (1.97)  (2.13)
5.2. Standard deviation  20.04  21.72  20.31  18.15  19.63
5.3. Coefficient  ofvariation  0.90  0.83  0.66  0.27  0.28
5.4. Minirunvalue  0  2.06  2.41  1.18  0.34
5.5. Maximum  value  100  100  100  96.30  99.59
Standard error of the mean in parentheses.
The valid number of observations in all cases is 85, except for the local governments share in total
consolidated regional expenditures in 1994 (83).
The cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, Chechnya and Ingushetia excluded from the sample.
* Calculated as a ratio of the sum of the total expenditures of all tiers of local government minus the
expenditures on transfers from one local government to another and the sum of the total expenditures of local
and regional governments minus the expenditures on transfers from regions to local governments and from
local governments to regions.20
Despite its already high value (85.6% in 1992), by 1996 the average share of local governments
in consolidated regional expenditures on "Education" gained additional 2 percentage points. This
expenditure category has been a firm prerogative of local governments in practically all regions -
between 1992 and 1996 the values of the respective coefficient of variation remained exceptionally low at
around 0.09. Also, compared to other types of expenditures, the minimum value across regions of the
average share of local governments in public spending on "Education" was remarkably high: 56% in 1992
and 59.2% in 1996.
The single most notable expansion of local governments' expenditure responsibilities was in the
sphere of  "Social Protection". Between 1992 and 1996, the average share of local governments in
consolidated regional expenditures on "Social Protection" rose from 22.3% to 70.8%. As noted by Lavrov
(1996a) however, this seemingly drastic change in policies may at least in part might reflect a 1994
change in the budget classification, which moved the formerly separate category "Allowances for
Children and Other Social Transfers to the Population" in the expenditure item "Social Protection".
Between 1992 and 1996, the regional disparities in local governments involvement in "Social
Protection" diminished substantially, as the respective coefficient of variation fell by nearly 70 percentage
points right after the steep rise of the average share of local governments in consolidated regional
expenditures on "Social Protection" in 1995.
A more detailed look at local governments'  involvement in "Social Protection" by economic
region'0 however, shows that the Northern Region did not participate in the observed rapid decentralization
of this type of expenditures. As the data in Table  11 shows, up to 1994 the Northern Region was in line
with the rest of the country by degree of decentralization of the "Social Protection" expenditures. But in
1994, it did not follow the countrywide rapid expansion of local governments'  involvement in that sphere.
And even though the average share of local governments in consolidated regional expenditures on "Social
Protection" in the North Region consequently doubled to 36.5% in 1996, it was still half of the national
average.
Table 11. Average Shares of Local Governments in "Social Protection"
Expenditures in the Northern Region and in the Russian Federation, %
Aierage Shares  / Year  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
1. Average  Share  of Local  Govemrnents  in
Consolidated  Regional  Expenditures  on Social
Protection  in  the Northern  Region  18.38  15.19  17.45  34.84  36.52
(7.86)  (3.61)  (4.34)  (12.3)  (13.85)
2. Average  Share  of Local  Govemnrents  in
Consolidated  Regional  Expenditures  on Social
Protection  in the Russian  Federation  22.34  26.31  30.77  67.46  70.79
(2.17)  (2.36)  (2.2)  (1.97)  (2.13)
Standard  error of the mean in  parentheses.
'O  The official  statistics  divide  the constituents  of the Russian  Federation  in 11 economic  regions  based  on their
geographic  location.  For example,  the Northern  Region  includes  Komi  Republic,  Karelia  Republic,  Arkhangel'sk
Oblast,  Nenets  Autonomous  Okrug,  Vologda  Oblast  and Murmansk  Oblast.21
Section  6. Measures  of regional decentralization  and subordination.
To evaluate  the level of fiscal decentralization  within  the Russian  regions,  we examine  the
distribution  of total expenditure  responsibilities  and revenue  assignments  between  regional  and local
governments.  We construct  two simple  measures  of the level of fiscal decentralization,  using  the data
respectively  from the revenue  and expenditure  side of consolidated  regional  budgets:
- The  ratio between  local governments  total revenuesl and the consolidated  regional  budget  revenues12
- The  ratio between  local governments  total expenditures' 3 net of transfers  to regions and the
consolidated  regional budget  expenditures1 4
The measure  of fiscal decentralization  on the expenditure  side of consolidated  regional  budgets is
defined  in such  a manner  to provide  information  about the share of local governments  in final budget
outlays 15 (purchases  of goods  and services  from the rest of the economy).
Furthermore,  we explore  the degree  of subordination  of local to regional  budgets  using the
following  measure  -- the ratio between  regional  transfers  to local governments  and local governments
total expenditures16.
Thus,  the two measures  of fiscal  decentralization  within regions  refer  to the downward  shift of
control  over budget  revenues  and expenditures  from regional  to local governments.  The measure  of fiscal
subordination  is used to describe  the dependence  of local governments  on transfers  from regions.
The statistical  analysis  presented  below is conducted  with data on 85 of the 89 regions of the
Russian  Federation.  The regions  removed  from the sample  are Chechnya,  Ingushetia,  Moscow  City and
St. Petersburg  City. The first two are  dropped  because  of the poor quality  or lack of data on most of the
variables.  As mentioned  above,  the special status of the last two as federal  cities puts the issue of fiscal
decentralization  out of context.
Table 12 presents  the values  of the two measures  of fiscal decentralization  together  with selected
summary  statistics for the period 1994  - 1996.
Calculated  as the  sum  of the  total  revenues  of  all tiers  of local  government  minus  the  revenues  from  transfers  from
one  local  government  to another.
12 Calculated  as the  sum  of the  total  revenues  of  local  and  regional  govermments  minus  the  revenues  from  transfers
from  regions  to local  governments  and  from  local  governments  to regions.
13 Calculated  as  the  sum  of  the  total  expenditures  of  all tiers  of local  government  minus  the  expenditures  on  transfers
from  one  local  government  to another.
14 Calculated  as the  sum  of the  total  expenditures  of  local  and  regional  governments  minus  the  expenditures  on
transfers  from  regions  to local  governments  and from  local  governments  to regions.
15 Our  database  does  not provide  data  on regional  transfers  to the federal  government  and  consequently  this  type  of
interbudgetary  transfers  is not  netted  out of  the  consolidated  regional  budget  expenditures.
16 Calculated  as the  sum  of the  total  expenditures  of all tiers  of local  government  minus  the  expenditures  on  transfers
from  one local  government  to another.22
Table 12. Measures of Fiscal Decentralization, %
Summary  Statistics  / Year  1994  1995  1996
1. Ratio between  local governments  total
revenues  and the consolidated  regional
budget  revenues
1.1.  Mean  62.37  67.83  70.25
(1.18)  (1.27)  (1.43)
1.2.  Standard  deviation  10.73  11.7  13.02
1.3.  Coefficient  of variation  0.17  0.17  0.19
1.4.  Minimum  value  26.81  22.76  11.96
1.5.  Maximum  value  85.35  97.76  96.69
1.6.  Valid number  of observations  83  85  83
2. Ratio between  local governments  total
expenditures  before  transfers  and the
consolidated  regional  budget expenditures
2.1. Mean  62.8  65.94  67.67
(1.08)  (1.05)  (1.15)
2.2. Standard  deviation  9.83  9.71  10.63
2.3. Coefficient  of variation  0.16  0.15  0.16
2.4. Minimum  value  26.81  33.34  36.59
2.5. Maximum  value  84.27  83.8  86.58
2.6. Valid number  of observations  83  85  85
Standard  error of the mean  in parentheses.
Throughout the sample period, there was a clear tendency toward greater fiscal  decentralization
on both sides of consolidated regional budgets. Between 1994 and 1996, the average share of local
governments in consolidated regional budget revenues has increased by 7.9 percentage points, while at
the same time the relative size of their outlays in consolidated regional public expenditures has risen by
4.9 percentage points1 7. Before 1995, the average expenditure share of local governments was broadly in
line with their share in budget revenues. This trend was reversed in 1995-96. In 1996 local governments
received 70.3% of all revenues but financed only 67.7% of consolidated regional budget expenditures.
This was related to noticeable expansion of regional budget deficits.
The breakdown of Russian regions by administrative type into republics, oblasts and krais4 8, and
autonomous okrugs'9 unravels interesting patterns in the degrees of fiscal decentralization across groups.
Tables 13 and 14 present data on the average ratio between local governments total revenues and the
consolidated regional budget revenues and local governments share in the consolidated regional final
expenditures by administrative type of region.
17 These  changes  in the means for both  variables  are statistically  significant  at the 99% level in  paired-samples  t-
tests  of the equality  of the respective  means.
18 Oblasts  and krais were pooled  together  because  of the numerous  similarities  between  them.
19  Including  one autonomous  oblast -Yevreyskaya  Autonomous  Oblast.23
Table 13: Revenue Decentralization by Administrative Type of Region, %
Measure  of Fiscal Decentralization  / Year  1994  1995  1996
1. Ratio  between local governments  total
revenues and the consolidated  regional
budget  revenues in:
1.1  Republics
- Mean  53.78  61.27  68.12
(1.93)  (3.32)  (3.38)
- Minimum  41.73  22.76  40.78
- Maximum  66.60  97.76  96.69
- Valid number  of observations  19  19  19
1.2  Oblasts and Krais
- Mean  66.41  71.40  73.89
(0.96)  (0.97)  (1.12)
- Minimum  50.74  56.09  56.98
- Maximum  79.79  88.12  91.82
-Valid number  of observations  55  55  54
1.3  Autonomous  Okrugs
-Mean  55.84  61.34  54.68
(6.17)  (5.17)  (5.96)
-Minimum  26.81  33.51  11.96
-Maximum  85.35  84.93  77.27
- Valid number  of observations  9  11  10
Standard error of the mean in parentheses24
Table 14: Expenditure Decentralization by Administrative Type of Region, %
Measure  of Fiscal  Decentralization  / Year  1994  1995  1996
1. Ratio between  local governments  total
expenditures  before  transfers  and the
consolidated  regional  budget expenditures  in:
1.1 Republics
-Mean  55.75  60.16  62.29
(1.82)  (1.9)  (2.38)
- Minimum  42.33  42.12  42.78
- Maximum  76.23  71.25  81.57
- Valid number  of observations  19  19  19
1.2  Oblasts  and Krais
- Mean  66.29  68.66  70.14
(0.91)  (0.93)  (1.16)
- Minimum  46.07  46.21  46.15
-Maximum  79.24  81.87  86.58
- Valid number  of observations  55  55  55
1.3 Autonomous Okrugs
- Mean  56.39  62.29  64.65
(5.71)  (5.14)  (4.86)
- Minimum  26.81  33.34  36.59
- Maximum  84.27  83.80  84.84
- Valid number  of observations  9  11  11
Standard error of the mean in parentheses
The data in Tables 13 and 14 unequivocally show the substantial and persistent gap between the
degrees of fiscal decentralization on both sides of consolidated regional budgets in oblasts and krais and
the other types of regions. In all years, oblasts and krais, i.e. ethnically Russian regions, boasted the
highest average ratios between local governments total revenues and expenditures before transfers and the
consolidated regional budget revenues and final expenditures respectively, with the pair wise differences
in the corresponding means being statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence0 in 1994 and
1995. Oblasts and krais are also the most homogenous group in terms of the achieved degree of fiscal
decentralization - the standard error of the mean for this type of regions is more than 6 times smaller than
that of autonomous okrugs and 3 times that of republics. The observed differences among the group
means were somewhat subdued in 1996, when the difference in the means of the degree of revenue
decentralization in oblasts and krais and republics seized to be statistically significant. The same was also
true for the difference in the means of the degree of expenditure decentralization in oblasts and krais and
autonomous okrugs in 1996.
Table  15 presents the values of the two measures of fiscal subordination of regional and local
governments together with selected summary statistics for the period 1994 - 1996.As Table 15 shows,
interbudgetary transfers from higher levels of the government were a significant source of revenues for
20Comparison  of means  conducted  with  One-way  Analysis  of Variance  supplemented  with Least-significant
Difference Tests.25
both regional  and local goverrnents throughout  the whole period.  Between 1994  and 1996,  the ratio of
regional transfers  to total expenditures  of local governments  fluctuated  in a narrow  band of 35%. At the
same  time, with the exception  of 1995  the ratio of federal transfers  to total regional expenditures  stayed
around  42.5%.  In 1995  federal  transfers  to regional  governments  were substantially  reduced.  The seven
percentage  points drop in the average  value of the above  ratio coincided  with a drastic increase  in regional
disparities  - in one year the coefficient  of variation  jumped by 43%. This apparent  shock  to the system  of
federal transfers  quickly  disseminated  and by 1996  both the mean of the ratio of federal  transfers  to total
regional expenditures  and its coefficient  of variation  returned  to their pre-1995  values.
Table 15. Measures  of Fiscal Subordination  of Subnational
Governments  in the Period 1994  - 1996, %
Summary  Statistics  / Year  1994  1995  1996
1.  Ratio  between  regional  transfers  to local
governments  and  local  governments  total
expenditures
1.1. Mean  36.87  33.40  34.85
(1.71)  (1.65)  (1.78)
1.2. Standard  deviation  15.48  15.18  16.39
1.3.  Coefficient  of variation  0.42  0.45  0.47
1.4. Minimum  value  0  3.01  0
1.5.  Maximum  value  91.73  74.77  82.45
1.6.  Valid number  of observations  82  85  85
2. Ratio  between  federal  transfers  to
regional  governments  and  total  regional
expenditures
2.1. Mean  42.35  35.36  42.58
(2.38)  (2.8)  (2.46)
2.2. Standard  deviation  21.41  25.51  22.24
2.3. Coefficient  of variation  0.51  0.72  0.52
2.4. Minimum  value  1.61  0  0.04
2.5. Maximum  value  96.05  99.71  88.95
2.6. Valid number  of observations  81  83  82
Standard  error  of the  mean  in parentheses26
Table 16 presents data on the average degree of fiscal subordination of local to regional
governments by administrative type of region.
Table 16: Fiscal Subordination of Local Governments by
Administrative Type of Region, %
Measure  of Fiscal  Subordination  / Year  1994  1995  1996
1. Ratio between  regional  transfers  to local
governments  and local governments  total
expenditures  in:
1.1 Republics
- Mean  48.18  43.05  44.70
(4.36)  (4.22)  (4.31)
- Minimum  18.81  7.08  0
- Maximum  91.73  68.46  75.39
- Valid number  of observations  19  19  19
1.2  Oblasts  and Krais
- Mean  32.83  29.30  31.85
(1.2)  (1.13)  (1.26)
- Minimum  16.80  14.98  11.85
- Maximum  59.79  52.74  54.31
- Valid number  of observations  55  55  55
1.3  Autonomous  Okrugs
- Mean  37.74  37.23  32.81
(9.74)  (7.75)  (9.10)
- Minimum  0  3.01  0
- Maximum  72.09  74.77  82.45
- Valid number  of observations  8  11  11
Standard error of the mean in parentheses
Between 1994 and 1996, there were substantial differences in the importance of regional transfers
as sources of funds for local budgets in oblasts and krais and the other types of regions. Oblasts and krais
have maintained the lowest average ratio between regional transfers to local governments and local
governments' total expenditures. The difference in the average values of this variable in republics and
oblasts and krais is statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence in all years in One-way
Analysis of Variance supplemented with Least-significant difference tests of the equality of the
corresponding means. Overall, regional transfers were most important for local governments in republics,
followed by autonomous okrugs, and oblasts and krais.
This finding, combined with the results from the analysis of the measures of fiscal
decentralization by administrative type of regions, outlines two distinctive patterns in the downward
transfer of fiscal responsibilities in the Russian Federation. In both cases, local governments end up with
more budget resources and a wider range of expenditure responsibilities. In the case of oblasts and krais
however, this is achieved by entitling local authorities to a bigger share of the consolidated regional
budget revenues, whereas in republics and autonomous okrugs (before 1996) the expansion of local
outlays has been financed by larger interbudgetary transfers from regional governments. Thus, we have27
identified two different patterns of fiscal evolution in Russian regions: the former could be called "true
decentralization", the latter may be described as a "redistribution model".
Table 17 presents data on the average ratio between federal transfers to regional governments and
total regional expenditures in different administrative types of regions.
Table 17: Fiscal Subordination of Regional Governments by
Administrative Type of Region, %
Measure  of Fiscal  Subordination  / Year  1994  1995  1996
1. Ratio  between  federal  transfers  to
regional  governments  and total
regional  expenditures  in:
1.1  Republics
-Mean  51.19  44.77  47.55
(7.49)  (7.42)  (6.18)
-Minimum  1.61  0  0.04
- Maximum  96.06  98.62  88.95
- Valid number  of observations  17  18  19
1.2  Oblasts  and Krais
- Mean  37.30  27.95  40.70
(1.93)  (2.25)  (2.62)
- Minimum  10.34  1.85  4.37
-Maximum  75.13  69.72  82.19
-Valid  number  of observations  55  55  53
1.3  Autonomous  Okrugs
-Mean  56.45  59.19  43.11
(9.05)  (11.14)  (9.13)
-Minimum  8.86  3.18  4.44
- Maximum  78.40  97.23  87.68
- Valid number  of observations  9  9  10
Standard error of the mean in parentheses
As seen from the table, in 1994 and 1995 oblasts and krais received much less federal assistance
than both republics and autonomous okrugs 21. In 1995, the mean of the ratio of federal transfers to total
regional expenditures in autonomous okrugs was more than twice the average in oblasts and krais. In
1996, the federal government finally adopted a more equitable allocation scheme of federal assistance
among the different types of regions. A plausible explanation of the huge discrepancies between the
amount of grants received by republics and autonomous okrugs, and oblasts and krais until 1996 is that
the federal government tried to use the transfers as the "carrot" in its policy to discourage the attempts of
non-Russian regions to become independent states (Treisman,  1996).
21 The differences  in  the average  ratios between  federal  transfers  to regions  and total regional  expenditures  in
republics  and oblasts  and krais, and in autonomous  okrugs  and oblasts  and  krais are statistically  significant  in both
years at the 95% level of confidence.28
Next, we turn to the coefficients  of correlation  between  different measures  of fiscal
decentralization  and subordination  (Table 18).
Table 18: Coefficients  of Correlation  between  Measures  of Fiscal
Decentralization  and Subordination  in Russian  Regions
Covariates / Year  1994  1995  1996
Ratio  between  local  governments  total  expenditures
before  transfers  and  the  consolidated  regional  budget  0.89  0.80  0.76
expenditures  -Ratio  between  local  governments  total  089  080  0.76
revenues  and  the  consolidated  regional  budget  revenues  (83)  (85)  (83)
Ratio  between  local  governments  total  expenditures
before  transfers  and  the  consolidated  regional  budget
expenditures  -Ratio  between  regional  transfers  to local  -0.33  -0.10*  -0.09*
governments  and  local  governments  total  expenditures  (82)  (85)  (85)
Ratio  between  federal  transfers  to regional  governments
and  total  regional  expenditures  -Ratio  between  local  -0.48  -0.33  0.004*
governments  total  revenues  and  the  consolidated  (81)  (82)  (80)
regional  budget  revenues
Ratio  between  federal  transfers  to regional  governments
and  total  regional  expenditures  -Ratio  between  regional  0.50  0.60  0.53
transfers  to local  governments  and  local  governments  (80)  (83)  (82)
total  expenditures
Numbers  in parenthesis  represent  the number  of regions  used  in the  correlation  analysis.
Unless  otherwise  indicated,  all correlation  coefficients  are  significant  at the  99%  level  of confidence.
* Statistically  insignificant  at  the  95%  level  of confidence.
As seen from the first row of Table 18,  there is a strong  positive correlation  between  the share of
local governments  in consolidated  regional final expenditures  and the ratio of local governments  total
revenues  to the consolidated  regional  budget  revenues.  However,  the statistical  link between  the two
measures  of fiscal  decentralization  weakened  over time, dropping  from 0.89 in 1994  to 0.76 in 1996.  One
possible explanation  of the above  trend  might derive from quickly  expanding  deficits of some but not all
regional budgets:  local governments'  share in expenditures  in such cases does not correspond  to their
share in revenues.
The second  raw of Table 18 suggests  that there is no link between  the incidence  of regional
transfers  and degree of fiscal decentralization.  High dependence  of local governments  on regional
transfers indicates  neither  high nor low decentralization  level.
Another interesting  finding  of the correlation  analysis  is that in 1994-95  the size  of federal grants
to regions relative  to the consolidated  regional  expenditures  was negatively  correlated  with the share of
local governments  in consolidated  regional  expenditures  (third raw of Table 18).  In 1996,  this correlation
coefficient  became  statistically  insignificant.  At the same  time, however,  the sizes of the federal  and
regional transfers  relative  to the total regional  and local governments  total expenditures,  respectively,
remained  strongly  positively  correlated  (see the last  row of Table 18).29
Thus, the impact  of federal  transfers  on fiscal decentralization  at the regional  level was mixed.  On
one hand, federal  aid was by no means  concentrated  in regions  with the highest degree  of fiscal
decentralization,  but on the other,  larger  federal  transfers to regions  resulted  in larger  transfers  from
regions  to local governments,  and thus indirectly  promoted  some decentralization.  In the preceding
section,  we identified  two distinct  patterns of fiscal decentralization  prevalent  in Russian  regions  of
different  administrative  type. In oblasts and krais, the downward  shift of expenditure  responsibilities  is
generally  financed  through increases  in the share of local governments  in consolidated  regional  revenues
- "true decentralization".  In autonomous  okrugs  and republics,  however,  relatively  more  funds for local
budgets are provided  by regional  governments  via interbudgetary  transfers  - "decentralization  through
transfers".  Consequently,  the results of the correlation  analysis  suggest  that federal transfers  to regions
promoted  the process  of fiscal decentralization  in autonomous  okrugs  and republics  and slowed  down  it in
oblasts  and krais.
Section  7. Decentralization  and Economic  Performance.
The panel-data  regression  analysis  conducted  in this section  addresses  the following  specific
issues  related  to the nature and impact  of fiscal decentralization  within  Russian  regions:
*  What are the main social  and economic  determinants  of the degree  of fiscal decentralization  within
Russian  regions?
*  Is there a link between  regional  fiscal decentralization  and public  expenditures  policy (measured
through the structure  of the consolidated  budget  expenditures)?
*  Does  the degree of fiscal  decentralization  have an influence  over regional economic  performance?
In the initial stages of our empirical  investigation  of these problems,  we have considered  the
following  set of social and economic  variables  as potential  determinants  of the degree  of fiscal
decentralization  within  Russian  regions:
A. Geographic  and administrative  characteristics:
*  Geographic  location  (regions  divided in 11 zones, so called  "economic  regions", based  on their
location)
*  Territory  of region as percent of the total territory of the Russian  Federation  (%)
*  Population  density  in 1994  (persons  per square  kilometer)
*  Administrative  type (republic,  oblast and krai, autonomous  okrug)
B. Social  variables:
*  Share of the poor population  (%) - 1994  and 1995  data only
*  Money income  as percent of the subsistence  minimum
*  Unemployment  rate (%) - 1994  and 1995  data only
*  Share of rural population  in 1994  (%)
*  Rate of infant  mortality  (number  of babies  per 1000  live births,  who died  before reaching  the age of
one)
*  Infant  mortality in 1990  - used as a reference  variable  that reflects specific  social characteristics  of
Russian  regions prevalent  before  the transition  to market economy
*  Life expectancy  (years)30
C. Economic variables:
*  Real (1991 Rubles) per capita GDP  - 1994  and 1995  data only
*  Annual real per capita income  (1991  Rubles)
*  Annual rate of inflation  (%)
*  Real industrial  output  growth  (as % of previous  year)
*  Growth  of investment  (as % of previous  year)
*  Percent  of arrears  in enterprise  payables (1995  and 1996  data only)
D. Fiscal  variables:
*  Federal  transfers  to regions as percent of total regional expenditures  (%)
*  Regional  transfers  to local governments  as percent of local governments'  total expenditures  (%)
*  Share of expenditures  on National  Economy  in the consolidated  regional  budget  expenditures  (%)
*  Share of expenditures  on Education  in the consolidated  regional  budget  expenditures  (%)
*  Share of expenditures  on Health and Sport  in the consolidated  regional  budget  expenditures  (%)
*  Share of expenditures  on Social  Protection  in the consolidated  regional  budget  expenditures  (%)
*  Real (1991 Rubles)  per capita  consolidated  regional  expenditures  on National  Economy
•  Real (1991 Rubles)  per capita  consolidated  regional  expenditures  on Education
*  Budget  arrears  as percent  of consolidated  regional  budget  expenditures  (%)  - 1995  and 1996  data only
*  Tax arrears  as percent  of the consolidated  regional  tax revenues  (%) - 1995  data only
*  Accumulated  debt as percent  of consolidated  budget  revenues  net of transfers  (%) - 1995  and 1996
data only
*  Local governments  budget  balance  (negative  sign indicates  a deficit)  as percent  of local governments
total expenditures  (%)
*  Regional  budget  balance  (negative  sign indicates  a deficit)  as percent  of total regional  expenditures
(%)
*  Consolidated  regional  budget  balance  (negative  sign indicates  a deficit)  as percent  of consolidated
regional budget  expenditures  (%)
The statistical  analysis  presented  below is conducted  with the data on 85 of the 89 regions of the
Russian  Federation.  The  regions removed  from the sample  are Chechnya,  Ingushetia,  the cities of
Moscow  and St. Petersburg.  The first two are dropped  because  of the poor quality or lack of data on most
of the variables.  The special status  of the last two as federal cities puts the issue of fiscal decentralization
out of context.  We use the values  of the above  listed variables over the period 1994-1996  for each of the
remaining  85 regions  to construct  the panel used in the subsequent  regression  analysis.  If there is no data
on a particular  variable  for a given  region  in a given  year, missing values  are  recorded in the data set. In
the case of variables  such as the rate of infant  mortality  in 1990  and the percent of rural population  in
1994,  for which we are only interested  in how  their values in some base year (1990  and 1994
respectively)  affect the future outcomes  of the dependent  variable,  we record  the base values of these
variables  three times in the data set - once for every year in the sample.  The summary  regression  results
tables presented  in this section  are constructed  using  the following  convention.  We first identify  the
preferred  regression  model of the dependent  variable  using standard  econometric  techniques.  We then test
for the presence  of heteroskedasticity  and correlation  in regression  residuals  using the White test for
general  heteroskedasticity/ 2 and the Durbin-Watson  testf 3 for first-order  serial correlation.  If the resulting
22 The  test  statistics  are  computed  using  auxiliary  regressions,  in which  the  squared  residuals  from  the  regressions
presented  in Tables  19,20  and  21 are  regressed  on a constant,  the explanatory  variables  from  the  original
regressions  and  all  possible  (nonredundant)  cross  products  of  the explanatory  variables,  with  the  exception  of
those  involving  dummy  variables.31
value of the White test statistic is significant at the 95% level of confidence, in the summary tables we
report the White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of the OLS coefficients. Due to the short
time-dimension of our panel and the somewhat arbitrary construction and hence obscure interpretation of
the Durbin-Watson statistic in panel data models (see footnote 24), no attempts have been made to correct
for the possible existence of serial correlation in OLS residuals. Nevertheless, in all regression models
presented below we show the estimated value of the Durbin-Watson statistic.
Table 19 presents the final results from our regression analysis of the determinants of fiscal
decentralization within Russian regions. The regression output in Table  19 identifies a common set of
factors that influence the degree of fiscal decentralization on both the revenue and expenditure sides of
consolidated regional budgets. The measures of revenue and expenditure decentralization are both
negatively related to the rate of infant mortality in 1990 and the rate of inflation in regions. The first
variable is an indicator of the social and economic development of Russian regions prior to the
transition 24. In our view, it reflects fundamental historical differences in regional wellbeing - such as real
incomes, quality of and access to health care, development of infrastructure, ethnic and religious customs,
etc.2' The second variable is an indicator of the degree of macroeconomic instability inflicted on regional
economies. For 1994-96 the inflation indicator also reflects regional peculiarities of price liberalization:
usually during this period, inflation was higher in regions, where during the initial years of reforms
(1992-93), regional administrations imposed stronger price control, thus delaying both liberalization and
economic restructuring.
The OLS estimates of the influence of the rate of infant mortality in 1990 on the degrees of
revenue and expenditure decentralization in regions are (-0.94) and (-0.87) respectively. Thus, if we take
two regions with identical rates of inflation, geographic location and administrative status, where the
values of the rate of infant mortality in 1990 differed by one basic point (one death per 1000 live births),
the predicted shares of local governments in consolidated budget revenues and final expenditures in the
region with higher rate of infant mortality would be approximately 0.9 percentage points smaller than
those in the other region. The OLS coefficients of the rate of inflation in the two regressions are (-0.03)
and (-0.02) respectively, suggesting a much weaker influence of the degree of macroeconomic instability
on the decentralization outcome. All reported coefficients are statistically significant at the 99% level of
confidence.
When we tried to substitute the rate of infant mortality in 1990 with the values of the same
variable over the period of 1994-1996 as an explanatory variable, it provided the above regressions with
much lower OLS coefficients 2 6 (in the magnitude of (-0.4) and (-0.2) respectively) and also it worsened
the overall fit of the two regressions. Thus, only the historical differences in regional standards of living,
captured by the interregional disparities in the rate of infant mortality prior to the transition, help explain
the variation in fiscal decentralization in the subjects of the Russian Federation.
23 In panel  data models,  the estimation  of the Durbin-Watson  statistic  requires  prior transfortnations  of the regression
output.  First,  the residuals  for the different  cross-sections  are stacked  on top of one another,  separated  by
additionally  included  "N/A" values.  Then,  the standard  formula  of the Durbin-Watson  statistic  is applied  to this
augmented  set of residuals.
24 In the economic  literature  infant  mortality  is often  used to construct  of composite  measures  of poverty.  Please,
note a reliable  indicator  of pre-transition  regional  poverty  in Russia is not available.
25 Tuva  Republic,  Evenk  Autonomous  Okrug  and Altay Republic  had the highest  infant  mortality  rate in 1990  that
exceeded  30 deaths  per 1000  newborns.  North  Osetia  Republic,  Smolensk  Oblast,  Chuvashia  Republic  and
Voronezh  Oblast  had the lowest  infant  mortality  rate, below 14.
26 Marginally  statistically  significant  at the 95% level of confidence  in the case of the measure  of revenue
decentralization  and insignificant  in the second  regression.32
Table 19. Determinants of Fiscal Decentralization
Local govemments  Local governments
Local governments  total expenditures
totalreveues  s  beoretransfxentrs  a
Regressors / Dependent  Variable  percentuesas  before transfers  as
consolidated  regional  percent of the
consolidated  regional budget  revenues  budget expenditures
Constant  91.18  83.84
(18.3)  (21.32)
Infant mortality  in 1990  -0.94  -0.87
(-3.16)  (-3.62)
Inflation  -0.03  -0.02
(-4.85)  (-3.44)
Dummy  Republic  -8.71  -8.61
(4.64)  (-6.22)
Dummy  Autonomous  Okrug  -10.55  -6.84
(-3.55)  (-3.05)
Dummy  Northern  Region  -5.66 *
(-2.15)
Dummy  Ural Region  7.05
(4.12)
Dummy  Western  Siberia  Region  7.47
(3.7)
Dummy  Eastern Siberia  Region  6.66  10.67
(2.59)  (4.97)
Sample  1994 1996  1994 1996
Total Panel (Unbalanced)  Observations  251  253
Adjusted  R-squared  0.31  0.32
Durbin-Watson  0.97  0.64
White's  Heteroskedasticity  Test  49.52  44.32
(0.00)  **  (0.00)  **
Standard  Error of Regression  10.18  8.45
Root Mean Squared  Residual  1994  8.76  7.57
Root Mean Squared  Residual  1995  9.72  7.97
Root Mean Squared  Residual  1996  11.45  9.31
Notes:
Unless  otherwise  indicted,  numbers  in  parenthesis  are t-statistics  calculated  with  the White
heteroskedasticity  consistent  standard  errors  of OLS coefficients.
Unless  otherwise  indicated,  OLS  coefficients  are statistically  significant  at the 99% level
of confidence.
* Statistically  significant  at the 95%  level of confidence
** P-value33
The available  regional  data on infant mortality  for 1994-96  demonstrate  unusually  large and
unstable  (with almost  chaotic  fluctuations  from year  to year)  changes  in this variable  after  the beginning
of transition. 27 This may be explained  by a scale and nature  of impact  of transition  on social  development,
which  was massive  and quite uneven  across regions  and across  different  time periods.  Also, the first years
of transition  were accompanied  by major  migration  flows  and deterioration  in a quality of demographic
statistics.
Even  after controlling  for regional differences  in the standard  of living, economic
mismanagement  and geographic  location,  the administrative  type of regions remains  an important
predictor of the degrees  of fiscal decentralization.  On the revenue  side, the OLS coefficients  of the
dummy  variables  Autonomous  Okrugs  and Republics  are  (-10.6) and (-8.7), while  on the expenditure  side
the corresponding  OLS estimates  are (-6.8) and (-8.6).  These  results imply that the predicted  values  from
the two regressions  of the shares  of local governments  in consolidated  budget  revenues  and final
expenditures  are significantly  lower in autonomous  okrugs  and republics  than in oblasts and krais.
Finally,  the regressions  suggest  that regional location  is another  significant  variable  to explain
variation  in fiscal decentralization.  Regions located  in three geographic  areas (Urals,  Western  and Eastern
Siberia)  on average  have much  higher degree  of decentralization  when it is measured  as a share of local
governments'  expenditures.  There  are two possible  explanations  of this phenomenon.  First, regions
located  next  to each other  tend to have similar budget  arrangements  and fiscal policy.  This similarity
derives from horizontal  inter-government  interactions  that are supported  through  activities  of local
associations  of regional  governments.  Second,  on average  regions in both Western  and Eastern  Siberia  are
the regions with the largest  territory.  The size of region's territory  might be in itself an important
determinant  of decentralization:  larger  territory requires  more delegation  of authority  to local
governments  and thus decentralization.
To test the latter hypothesis,  we re-estimate  the two decentralization  regressions  adding  the
relative size  of region's territory,  measured  as percent  of the total territory  of the Russian  Federation,  to
the explanatory  variables  discussed  above.  On the revenue  side of fiscal decentralization,  using  the full
sample of 85 regions  we obtain positive  and statistically  significant  at the 99% level of confidence  OLS
coefficient  (1.25)  of the relative size  of region's territory. However,  when we re-estimate  this augmented
regression  using all possible sub-samples  of 84 regions as a check  of the robustness  of the OLS
coefficients  (see the discussion  in the following  paragraph),  we discover  that the explanatory  power  of the
relative size of region's territory critically  hinges upon one extreme  realization  of that variable.  In
particular,  the territory of the Sakha  Republic  constitutes  18.2%  of the total territory of the Russian
Federation and it is also the region  with one of the highest  levels of revenue  decentralization  (in 1996  the
share of local governments  in consolidated  regional budget  revenues  was 93.5%). The  removal  of this
apparent  outlier from the sample,  renders  the OLS coefficient  of the relative size of region's territory
statistically  insignificant  even  at the 95% level of confidence.  Thus, after controlling  for regional
differences  in the standard  of living, economic  mismanagement,  geographic  location  and administrative
status, the size of region's territory is not an important  determinant  of the degree of revenue
decentralization.  On the expenditure  side of fiscal decentralization,  using the full sample  of 85 regions  we
obtain a much smaller and statistically  insignificant  at the 90% level of confidence  OLS  coefficient  (0.13)
of the relative size of region's territory.  Finally,  the population  density  -when used in place  of the relative
size of region's territory -does not show up significantly  in any of the two regressions.  In summary,  the
27 For  instance,  a correlation  coefficient  between  mortality  in 1994  and  in 1995  amounts  to 0.39  and  between  1994
and 1996  - to 0.46.34
empirical  evidence  strongly  rejects the hypothesis  that the differences  in the size  of regions' territories
can help explain  the observed  heterogeneity  of fiscal decentralization  outcomes.
It is worth noting  that our results suggest  that a positive  correlation  between  decentralization  and
regional  level of economic  development  exists only as a general  trend that could be tracked down  with
some lag.  We did not find any correlation  between  decentralization  and current  indicators  of regional
wealth such as local real per capita  incomes,  share of poor households,  etc.
Next, we check  the robustness  of the OLS coefficients  presented  in Table 19 by evaluating  their
dependence  on the particular  set of cross-sectional  units used in the panel-data  analysis.  To achieve  this,
we re-estimate  the regressions  of the shares  of local governments  in consolidated  regional budget
revenues  and final expenditures  with all possible sub-samples  of 84 out of 85 regions  and plot the
resulting  OLS  coefficients  and their 95% confidence  intervals? 8. If the observed  negative  link between
fiscal decentralization  and the incidence  of poverty  and macroeconomic  instability  in regions  hinges on
any one extreme  realization  of these  variables  in a given region,  then the elimination  of this outlier from
the sample  should  make  the corresponding  OLS coefficient  statistically  insignificant.  Following  this
convention,  we are able to show  that the coefficients  of the rate of infant  mortality  in 1990  and the rate of
inflation  remain statistically  significant  regardless  of which sample  of 84 regions we use in the estimation
of the two regressions,  thus confirming  the statistical  robustness  of the coefficients  presented  in Table 19.
The overall fit of the estimated  regressions  of the measures  of revenue  and expenditure
decentralization  is 0.31 and 0.32  respectively.  The lower  panel of Table 19 also contains information  on
the values  of the root mean squared  residuals 9 of the two regressions  for each year  covered by the panel.
The root mean  squared residual  is a measure  of the average  misfit of the estimated  panel-data  regression
to the actual  values of the dependent  variable  in that particular  year. Thus,  if the overall R-squared  of the
panel-data  regression  hinges on the good fit of the data in only one year,  then there should  be substantial
differences  between  the intertemporal  values  of the root mean  squared  residual.  The values  of the root
mean squared  residuals  of the two regressions  presented  in Table 19 are increasing  with time - from 8.8
and 7.6 percentage  points in 1994  to 11.5  and 9.3 percentage  points in 1996.  This comes as no surprise
given  the fact that the degrees  of fiscal decentralization  were shown  to depend  predominantly  on
fundamental  factors  - such  as administrative  type of regions,  geographic  location  and infant mortality  at
the start of the transition  - that do not change  over time. Using constant  base values of the explanatory
variables  to forecast  the future  behavior  of the degrees  of revenue  and expenditure  decentralization  will
inevitably  worsen  the fit of the regression  over time as the statistical  noise present in the relationship
compounds.  At the same  time, we expect that the stabilization  policy of the federal government  in 1995
could  bring about modifications  in regional  budget  arrangements  in 1996  and cause some changes  in the
link between  regional decentralization  and its major  determinants.
Table 20 presents  the results from the analysis  of the hypothesized  link  between  the structure  of
consolidated  regional  budget  expenditures  and the degree of fiscal decentralization  in regions. As seen
from the first column of Table 20, the share of expenditures  on Education  in the consolidated  regional
budget  expenditures  depends  positively  on the rate of infant  mortality  in 1990  and negatively  on the real
per capita  income in regions. The OLS  coefficient  of the rate of infant  mortality  in 1990 is substantive  in
28 In all  robustness  tests  presented  in this  paper,  if the  full-sample  regressions  yield  statistically  significant  value  of
the  White  test  of general  heteroscedasticity,  the  95%  confidence  intervals  of the  sub-sample  estimates  of OLS
coefficients  are  constructed  using  White  heteroskedasticity  consistent  standard  errors.
29The  root  mean  squared  residual  for  a particular  year  is calculated  by  first  estimating  the  regression  with  the  data
for all  three  years  in the  sample.  We  next  sum  the squared  OLS  residuals  from  this  regression  for  each  year  and
divide  the result by the number  of cross-sectional  units with valid data on all variables  in that  particular  year.35
Table 20. Impact of Decentralization on the Structure of Budget Expenditures
Share of expenditures  Share  of expenditures  on
Regressors / Dependent  Variable  on Education  in the  National  Economy  in the
consolidated  regional  consolidated  regional
budget  expenditures  budget  expenditures
Constant  4.80  43.07
(3.02)  (40.24)
Infant  mortality  in 1990  0.38
(4.43)
Percent  of rural population  in 1994  (6.22)  (-.37)
Local governments  total  revenues  as  0.12
percent  of the consolidated  regional  (5.96)
budget  revenues
Local governments  budget  deficit as  -0.10  0.10*
percent  of local governments  total  (-3.62)  (2.17)
expenditures
Real per capita income  -0.0003
(-4.36)
Dummy  North  Region  4.05  -7.17
(4.25)  (-5.15)
Dummy  North  Caucasus  Region  -3.15
(-3.02)
Dummy  Volgo-Vyatka  Region  -4.97
(-4.62)
Dummy  Ural Region  1.59  -3.54
(3.19)  (-4.61)
Dummy  Eastern Siberia  Region  -5.15
(-2.75)
Sample  1994 1996  1994 1996
Total Panel (Unbalanced)  Observations  243  255
Adjusted  R-squared  0.46  0.36
Durbin-Watson  0.89  0.90
White's  Heteroskedasticity  Test  85.91  62.69
(0.0O)  **  (0.00) **
Standard  Error of Regression  2.88  5.73
Root Mean Squared  Residual  1994  2.14  4.88
Root Mean Squared  Residual  1995  3.51  5.87
Root Mean Squared  Residual  1996  2.65  6.07
Notes:
Unless  otherwise  indicated,  numbers  in parenthesis  are t-statistics  calculated  with
the White  heteroskedasticity  consistent  standard  errors of OLS  coefficients
Unless  otherwise  indicated,  OLS  coefficients  are statistically  significant  at the 99%
level of confidence
* Statistically  significant  at the 95% level of confidence
** P-value36
value (0.38) and statistically  significant  at the 99% level of confidence.  The coefficient  in front of the real
per capita  income  implies that an one thousand 1991  Rubles difference  in the annual  per capita  income in
two otherwise  identical  regions will result in a 0.3 percentage  points smaller predicted  share of
expenditures  on Education  in the consolidated  budget outlays  of the wealthier  region.  Thus,  regions  with
higher  incidence  of poverty  (both in terms of real incomes  and overall standard  of living)  spend a bigger
proportion  of their consolidated  budgets on Education. 30 Less urbanized  regions  also tend to allocate  a
larger share of their budget  expenditures  to the sphere of Education,  as seen from the positive  coefficient
(0.1  1) in front of the share of rural population  in 1994.
Even  after controlling  for regional  disparities  in the incidence  of poverty  and for certain  other
demographic  and geographic  factors,  the degree  of revenue  decentralization  remains  an important
determinant  of the share of expenditures  on Education  in the consolidated  regional  budget  expenditures.
The OLS  coefficient  of the ratio between local governments  total revenues  and the consolidated  regional
budget  revenues  is positive  (0.12) and highly statistically  significant.  This result seems  to support  the
theoretical  proposition  that lower levels of government  tend to be more  responsive  to the social  needs of
the population  and thus decentralization  promotes  a more efficient  allocation  of resources.  Furthermore,
our regression  analysis  indicates  that in times of budget  revenue  shortfalls  local governments  cushion  the
negative  impact  of the lack of funds  on social expenditures  by expanding  budget  deficits.  The OLS
coefficient  in front of the ratio of local governments  budget  balance  to local governments  total
expenditures  is (-0.10)  and is statistically  significant  at the 99% level of confidence.  Thus, local
governments  with larger budget  deficits, for which the value of the above  ratio is negative  (negative
budget  balance  represents  a deficit)  and high in absolute  terms, tend to allocate a bigger  share of
consolidated  budget  expenditures  on Education.
Next, we check the robustness  of the OLS  coefficients  discussed  above by evaluating  their
dependence  on the particular  set of cross-sectional  units used in the panel-data  analysis.  To achieve  this,
we re-estimate  the regression  of the share of expenditures  on Education  in the consolidated  regional
budget  expenditures  with all possible sub-samples  of 84 out of 85 regions and plot  the resulting  OLS
coefficients  and their 95% confidence  intervals.  If the observed  positive  link between  the dependent
variable  and the degree  of revenue  decentralization  hinges on any one extreme  realization  of the latter for
a given  region,  then the elimination  of this outlier  from the sample  should  make the corresponding  OLS
coefficient  statistically  insignificant.  As seen from Figure 1 however,  the OLS coefficient  of the share  of
local governments  in the consolidated  regional  budget  revenues  remains statistically  significant  regardless
of which sample  of 84 regions we use, thus confirming  the statistical  robustness  of the corresponding  full-
sample  OLS  coefficient.  The same  is also true for the other explanatory  variables.
The adjusted  R-squared  of the regression  of the share of expenditures  on Education  in
consolidated  regional  budget expenditures  is 0.46 and the values of the root mean squared  residuals  of the
regression  in different  years are quite close  to each other.  Thus, the overall fit of the estimated  model is
good and consistent  over the time span of the panel. The conducted  White's test of general
heteroskedasticity  in regression  residuals  returns  a highly significant  value and consequently  all reported
t-statistics  are calculated  with the White heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors  of OLS coefficients.
30 This  is consistent  with  the  results  of other  studies  (Stewart,  1996;  Freinkman  and  Haney,  1997)  that  main  social
expenditures  in subnational  budgets  are  relatively  well  protected  against  budget  squeeze  and  vary  much  less  than
expected  between  poor  and  wealthy  regions.37
Figure 1: OLS Coefficients  and 95% Confidence  Intervals  of Local
Governments  Share  in Consolidated  Regional  Budget  Revenues
Estimated  with All Possible Sub-Samples  of 84 Regions
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The second  column  of Table 20 shows  the results of the regression  analysis  of the share of
expenditures  on National  Economy  in the consolidated  regional  budget  expenditures.  In contrast  to the
share of education  expenditures,  spending  on enterprise  and housing subsidies  is not related  to any of the
measures  of population's  wellbeing  in regions.  Besides  being contingent  on the geographic  location  of
regions,  the share of expenditures  on National  Economy  in the consolidated  regional budget  expenditures
tends to be higher  in more urbanized  regions. The OLS  coefficient  in front of the share of rural  population
in 1994  is (-0.17)  and statistically  significant  at the 99% level of confidence.  Our interpretation  of this
result is that it mainly  reflects the dynamics  of housing  subsidies  that are a dominating  component  in
National Economy  spending  item. In Russia, housing  subsidies  are disproportionally  concentrated  in
urban areas and therefore  local authorities  in regions  with higher  share of urban population  are  forced  to
allocate  a bigger  share of their budgets  on expenditure  on National  Economy.
A central  result of this regression  is the finding  that the share of expenditures  on National
Economy  in consolidated  regional  budget  expenditures  is negatively  related  to the size  of local
governments  budget  deficit.  The OLS coefficient  in front of the ratio between  local governments  budget
balance  and local governments  total expenditures  is positive  (0.10) and statistically  significant  at the 95%
level of confidence.  Local governments  with larger  budget  deficits,  for which the value of the above  ratio
is negative  (negative  budget  balance  represents  a deficit)  and high in absolute  terms,  tend  to allocate  a
smaller share of consolidated  budget  expenditures  on National  Economy.  Thus, local governments  are not
keen on expanding  subsidy  provision  at the expense  of the expansion  in deficit. hn  other  words,  local
governments'  response  to growing  deficits would  be likely to include  cuts in subsidies  but at the same
time they would keep educational  spending  relatively  protected.  This finding  is also broadly  consistent
the argument  that local governments  in Russia are less likely that regional administrations  to spend
taxpayers  money  on large enterprise  subsidies  (Freinkman  and Haney, 1997).38
Next, we check  the robustness  of the above OLS  coefficients  by evaluating  their dependence  on
the particular  set of cross-sectional  units used in the panel-data  analysis.  Applying  the same  techniques
used in the construction  of Figure 1, we are able to show  that the OLS estimate  of the coefficient  of the
share of rural population  in 1994  remains  statistically  significant  regardless  of which sample of 84 regions
is used in its estimation.  This is not the case however  for the coefficient  of the ratio between local
governments  budget  balance  and local governments  total expenditures.  In all sub-samples  the above
coefficient  is positive  and close  to its full-sample  value (0.10),  but seven of the sub-samples  render  it
statistically  insignificant  at the 95% level of confidence.  Thus,  while  the positive  relation  between  the
share  of expenditures  on National  Economy  in regional  budget  expenditures  and the relative  size of local
governments'  budget  balance  is a definitive  characteristic  of regional  fiscal systems  in the Russian
Federation,  the strength  of this link in the panel is derived  from the presence  of a number  of data outliers.
Consequently,  the full-sample  estimate  of the coefficient  of the ratio between  local governments  budget
balance  and local governments  total expenditures  should  be used with caution.
The adjusted  R-squared  of the regression  of the share of expenditures  on National  Economy  in
consolidated  regional  budget  expenditures  is 0.36. The rising values  of the root mean squared  residuals  of
the regression  over the time span of the panel indicate  that the fit of the regression  was best in earlier
years. The conducted  White's test of general  heteroskedasticity  in regression  residuals  returns  a highly
significant  value and consequently  all reported  t-statistics  are calculated  with the White
heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors of OLS coefficients.
Table 21 presents  the results from the analysis  of the link  between fiscal  decentralization  and
regional economic  and fiscal performance.  The second  column  of Table 21 suggests  that, as one may
expect, real industrial  growth  relates positively  to the purchasing  power of the population  and is
negatively  influenced  by macroeconomic  instability.  The large value of the OLS coefficient  in front of the
real per capita income implies  that an one thousand 1991  Rubles  difference  in the annual  per capita
income in two otherwise  identical  regions  will result in an 1  percentage  point higher  rate of real industrial
growth in the wealthier  region.  The OLS estimate  of the influence  of the rate of inflation  on real industrial
output  growth is (-0.03).  The central  finding  in this regression  is the positive  link between  the real growth
of industrial  output and the degree  of revenue decentralization.  The  value of the OLS  coefficient  of the
ratio between  local governments  total revenues  and consolidated  regional budget  revenues  is (0.15)  and is
statistically  significant  at the 95% level of confidence.39
Table 21. Impact of Decentralization on Fiscal and Economic Performance
Consolidated  regional  Real industrial  output
budget balance  as  growth





Percent  of rural population  in 1994  -0.17  *
(-2.23)
Local governments  total revenues  as  -0.15  0.15*
percent of the consolidated  regional  (-5.44)  (2.32)
budget  revenues
Regional  transfers  to local governments  0.22
as percent  of local governments  total  (2.62)
expenditures
Inflation  0.04  -0.03
(9.05)  (-6.14)
Real per capita income  0.001
(3.1)
Sample  1994 1996  1994 1996
Total Panel (Unbalanced)  Observations  250  243
Adjusted  R-squared  0.34  0.19
Durbin-Watson  1.64  2.25
White's  Heteroskedasticity  Test  85.61  26.21
(0.00)  **  (0.00)  **
Standard  Error of Regression  8.80  10.79
Root Mean Squared  Residual  1994  7.90  10.43
Root Mean Squared  Residual  1995  7.13  13.05
Root Mean Squared  Residual  1996  10.75  7.59
Notes:
Unless  otherwise  indicated,  numbers  in parenthesis  are t-statistics  calculated  with
the White  heteroskedasticity  consistent  standard  errors  of OLS  coefficients
Unless  otherwise  indicated,  OLS coefficients  are statistically  significant  at the 99%
level of confidence
* Statistically  significant  at the 95% level of confidence
** P-value
The OLS coefficients of real per capita income and the rate of inflation are statistically robust as
they remain statistically significant and close in value to the full-sample estimates, when re-estimated
with all possible sub-samples of 84 out of 85 regions. Figure 2 presents the OLS coefficients and the 95%
confidence intervals of the share of local governments in consolidated regional budget revenues. In all
sub-samples the above coefficient is positive and close to its full-sample estimate, but on one occasion
(when the Altay Republic is removed from the sample) it becomes marginally insignificant at the 95%
level of confidence. Consequently, while the positive link between revenue decentralization and the real40
industrial  output  growth  is well documented  by the data, caution  should be used in interpreting  the
magnitude  of this relation.
Figure 2: OLS Coefficients  and 95% Confidence  Intervals  of Local
Governments  Share  in Consolidated  Regional  Budget  Revenues
Estimated  with All Possible Sub-Samples  of 84 Regions
Local Govemments Share in Consolidated  Regional Revenues
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The adjusted  R-squared  of the regression  of real industrial  output  growth  is 0.19 and there is no
trend in the values  of the root mean squared  residuals  of the regression  over the time span of the panel.
The conducted  White's test of general  heteroskedasticity  in regression  residuals  returns  a statistically
significant  value at the 95% level of confidence  and consequently  all reported  t-statistics  are calculated
with the White  heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors of OLS coefficients.
Table 21 also describes  the link  between  the degree of revenue  decentralization  and the size and
sign of the consolidated  regional  budget  balance.  The relative  size of the consolidated  regional  budget
balance  is negatively  related  to the degree  of regional decentralization.  The value  of the OLS coefficient
of the measure  of revenue  decentralization  is (-0.15) and is statistically  significant  at the 99% level of
confidence.  Thus, regions  that assign  a bigger  share of total budget  revenues  to local governments  have  a
less favorable  budget  balance  position  (if we take two regions with identical  rates  of inflation,  share of
rural population  and relative size of regional  transfers  to local governments  total expenditures,  the region
that assigns  a bigger  share of budget  revenues  to local governments  will have a smaller  predicted  budget
surplus  or a large  deficit  than the more  centralized  one).
However,  regions  that channel  a bigger  portion  of funds  to local governments  through
interbudgetary  transfers  tend to have  a more  favorable  consolidated  budget  balance.  The coefficient  in
front of the relative size  of regional  transfers  to local governments  total expenditures  is positive  (0.22)
and highly statistically  significant.  Combination  of these two coefficients  may be interpreted  in a way that
decentralization  overall weakens  fiscal control  in regional  systems  but all other  factors  being  equal, a41
higher  role of transfers  mitigates  this impact  of decentralization.  Regional  transfers  tend  to be a more
efficient  instrument  of budget  control  within  decentralized  budget  systems  compared  to tax revenue
sharing.
Finally,  the relative  size of regional  budget  balance  is positively  related  with the rate of inflation
and negatively  with the share of rural  population  in regions. The respective  OLS coefficients  are (0.04)
and (-0.17)  and are both statistically  significant  at the 95% level of confidence.
Next, we check  the robustness  of the OLS  coefficients  discussed  above  by evaluating  their
dependence  on the particular  set of cross-sectional  units used in the panel-data  analysis.  Applying  the
same  techniques  used in the construction  of Figures 1 and 2, we are able to show that the OLS estimates
of the coefficients  of the rate of inflation,  the share of local governments  in consolidated  regional  budget
revenues  and the relative size of regional  transfers  to local governments  total expenditures  remain
statistically  significant,  regardless  of which sample  of 84 regions is used in their estimation.  This is not
the case  however  for the coefficient  of the share  of rural population  in 1994.  In all sub-samples  the above
coefficient  is negative,  but three of the sub-samples  render  it statistically  insignificant  at the 95% level  of
confidence.  Consequently,  the full-sample  estimate  of the coefficient  of the share of rural population  in
1994  (-0.17)  should  be interpreted  with due diligence.  Figure 3 demonstrates  the statistical  robustness  (in
terms  of independence  from data outliers)  of the OLS  estimate  of the coefficient  of the share of local
governments  in consolidated  regional  budget  revenues.
Figure 3: OLS Coefficients and 95% Confidence Intervals of Local
Governments Share in Consolidated Regional Budget Revenues
Estimated with All Possible Sub-Samples of 84 Regions
Share of Local Govemments  in Consolidated  Regional  Revenues
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The  adjusted  R-squared  of the regression  is 0.34 and the values  of the root mean squared
residuals  of the regression  indicate  that the fit of the estimated  model  was particularly  good in 1994  and
1995,  but worsened  in the following  year.  The conducted  White's test of general  heteroskedasticity  in
regression  residuals  returns a statistically  significant  value at the 95% level of confidence  and42
consequently  all reported  t-statistics  are calculated  with the White heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard
errors of OLS  coefficients.
8. Conclusions.
The analysis  of the data on the structure  of regional  budgets for 1992-96  suggests  that, while
quite substantive,  the relative share of local governments  in the Russian  consolidated  budget  did not
expand since 1994  and they remain in control  of about  a quarter  of total budget  expenditures.  However,  at
the subnational  level, the relative size of the local budgets  increased  at the expense  of some compression
in regional  budgets. 1996  was the first year, when local governments  collected  more budget  revenues
(6.4% of GDP)  and spent more than regional  administrations.  At the same time, the relative  role of local
governments  has been substantially  increasing  in all sorts of social financing  including  education,  health,
and social  protection.  With a growing  share  of federal budget  spent on debt service,  the role of the federal
government  in financing  public goods and services  increasingly  becomes  less important.
The  cross-regional  variation  in degree  of decentralization  of subnational  budgets  is high and so
far does not show  any decline.  Variation  in revenue  sharing is much  more serious  than  variation  on the
expenditure  side, where common  and stable  patterns  in expenditure  assignments  are quite noticeable  (e.g.
in education  and health).  All major taxes remain  to be shared  between  three government  levels, and no
progress  has made  towards a more  transparent  system of tax assignments.
Main factors  that could explain  this variation  in the degree  of decentralization  are the level of
poverty  and an administrative  status of the region.  Regions,  which have been  historically  less wealthy,
have a more centralized  budget  system. This seems  to represent  a global  phenomena:  urbanization,
growth in education,  and decentralization  are closely  inter-related,  and all positively  related to growth.
There  is a major difference  in budget  arrangements  between ethnically  Russian  regions and
national  republics  and okrugs.  In both cases,  the average  level of expenditure  decentralization  is similar
but the contrasts  on a revenue  side are striking.  In the case of oblasts and krais, decentralization  has been
evolving  through  the provision  of local authorities  with a bigger share of subnational  tax revenues,
whereas in republics  and autonomous  okrugs  (before 1996)  the expansion  of local outlays  has been
financed  through larger  interbudgetary  transfers  from regional  governments.  We describe  two various
patterns of fiscal evolution:  the former  could  be called "true decentralization",  the latter may  be described
as a "redistribution  model".
There  is also a significant  correlation  between  decentralization  and geographic  location.  Regions
situated in close proximity  tend to have similar budget  arrangements.  Interactions  between  neighbors  in
the area of budget  settings  seem  to be quite intensive  and probably  are supported  through  activities of
local regional  associations.  The size of region's territory  does not influence  the decentralization  outcome.
The analysis  provides  quite robust and statistically  significant  estimates  of the impact  of
decentralization  on fiscal and economic  performance.  In particular,  when we control for other social
variables such  as real per capita income, fiscal  decentralization  is positively  related  to the share of
education  spending  in regional consolidated  budgets.  Regions  with more decentralized  finances  tend to
have a lower economic  decline.  These  results seems  to be fully consistent  with conventional  predictions
of the decentralization  theory  that underline  potential  positive  growth impact  of decentralization.
At the same  time, negative  correlation  between  decentralization  and regional  budget  balance
suggests  that overall budget  control is weaker  in more decentralized  regions.  Instability  and non-43
transparency  of inter-governmental  fiscal relations  at the regional level in Russia does  not provide
individual  governments  with sufficient  incentives  for responsible  fiscal policy.  Under existing  fiscal
arrangements,  there is a risk that further  decentralization  could  be accompanied  by additional  growth  in
public deficit  and debt.
Given current  positive impact  of decentralization  in Russia on growth  and expenditure  structure,
the federal government  should  be more decisive in protecting  local self-governance  and budget  autonomy.
It should  develop  and enforce some universal  models  of interactions  between  regional and municipal
governments  that -within  the limits of the Constitution  -would  provide  for more stability  and
predictability  in formation  of local budgets and expand  minimum  requirements  on local shares  in main
taxes. To address  potential  negative  fiscal impacts  of decentralization,  the federal government  has to
impose stricter  limits on the size of subnational  governments'  current  budget deficit  as well as on the
overall stock of their debt.44
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APPENDIX  1: Budget  Revenues  by Level of Government
/ mln. current  Rubles /
BudgetRevenues  /Year  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Total Revenues  7087890  62956115  225736973  513808943  716729480
- federal  3865500  24883100  88132100  232117348  320307776
- regional  1581210  19257679  73163015  143457475  192489685
- local  1641180  18815336  64441858  138234120  203932019
Total  Revenues  Net of
Interbudgetary Transfers  6341454  N/A  183673998  440654824  597950853
- federal  3816100  24853300  86660854  230852255  319915976
- regional  1333971  16592346  50264032  112282721  137326207
- local  1191383  N/A  46749112  97519848  140708670
Transfers from Other Levels  of
Government  746436  N/A  42062975  73154119  118778627
- federal  49400  29800  1471246  1265093  391800
- regiDnal  247239  2665333  22898983  31174754  55163478
- local  449797  N/A  17692746  40714272  63223349
Total Tax Revenues  5631258  43097151  163986662  362316500  510714154
- federal  3395300  19656800  79187126  175345255  254419807
- regional  1095213  12211898  43235455  94919773  120908773
- local  1140745  11228453  41564081  92051472  135385574
Profit Tax  1564355  16822332  49007033  116646509  100690719
- federal  645900  5471600  17177304  41504403  36855317
-regional  471115  6684070  19050582  45527378  38681807
- local  447340  4666662  12779147  29614728  25153595
VAT  1999443  11259243  41680491  95226882  164055392
- federal  1500700  7251000  28025154  71787639  122776879
- regional  302792  2532278  8780230  13363949  25727697
- local  195951  1475965  4875107  10075294  15550816
Personal Income Tax  431025  4394486  17548546  36299400  56129966
- federal  0  0  108164  3269453  5143127
- regional  98458  1019594  4532897  8786503  13789278
- local  332567  3374892  12907485  24243444  37197561
Excise Taxes  209697  1780439  7468805  24059709  62603074
- federal  100500  898600  4485639  17527221  54364461
- regional  87830  715513  2391839  5130624  6432197
- local  21368  166326  591327  1401864  1806416
Property Taxes  53890  546696  4840812  16727397  36710926
- federal  0  0  0  831425  298287
-regional  28235  248826  2021871  7069226  16185905
- local  25656  297870  2818941  8826746  20226734
Natural Resources  Tax  121760  851973  2439097  12271205  22507838
- federal  0  248000  373964  2996888  5642115
- regional  77768  346024  1095885  4462422  8780583
- local  43992  257949  969248  4811895  8085140
OtherTaxes  1251237  7441973  41026378  61064101  68016239
- federal  1148200  5787600  29016901  37428226  29339621
-regional  29017  665584  5363151  10558458  11311306
- local  74020  988789  6646326  13077417  27365312
Non-Tax Revenues  710196  N/A  19687336  78338324  87236699
- federal  420800  5196500  7473728  55507000  65496169
- regional  238758  4380448  7028577  17362948  16417434
- local  50638  N/A  5185031  5468376  5323096
GDP  19000000  171500000  610700000  1630100000  220020000047
Notes:
1. The 1992,  1993  and 1994  data on "Total  Revenues"  on federal level have been augmented  with the
revenues  accrued  in the following  off-budget  accounts:  "Road  and Ecological  funds"  and "Foreign
Economic  Activity".
2. The category  "Other  Taxes"  on federal  level is obtained  as the difference  between  "Total  Tax
Revenues"  and the sum  of all itemized  tax revenues  shown in the above  table.
3. The category  "Other  Taxes"  on regional  and municipal  level is obtained  directly  from regional  budget
data. In 1992  and 1994  this category  includes  inter alia the revenues  from the Land  tax and
Gosudarstvennaia  poshlina.
4. The category  "Non-Tax  Revenues"  is calculated  as the difference  between  "Total  Revenues"  and the
sum of "Total  Tax Revenues"  and "Interbudgetary  Transfers,  Received".
5. Regional  and municipal  data for 1996  do not include  the revenues  of a number  of "closed  cities",  which
budgets  were not included  in the official  statistics  for previous  years.
6. The 1996  figure  of Municipal  Total Tax Revenues  is an estimate,  based on the municipal  budget  data48
APPENDIX 2: Budget Expenditures by Level of Government
/ mln. current Rubles /
Budget  Expenditures  /Year  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Total  Expenditures  10652046  79136666  281797011  587851384  901666566
- federal  7772300  43042900  148006980  300682605  487730641
- regional  1402813  18018044  71512993  148072692  207204439
-local  1476933  18075722  62277038  139096087  206731486
Total  Expenditures  Net  of
Interbudgetary  Transfers  9810435  N/A  235950128  508489455  776687684
- federal  7455500  38638200  124530211  265838751  430654280
- regional  g93412  N/A  49757657  106309492  142865748
-local  1461523  17478014  61662260  136341212  203167656
Transfers  to  OtherLevels  of
Government  841611  N/A  45846883  79361929  124978882
- federal  316800  4404700  23476769  34843854  57076361
- regional  509401  N/A  21755336  41763200  64338691
- local  15410  597708  614778  2754875  3563830
National  Economy  5020573  23061487  64706923  136006447  188338823
-federal  4056900  11202100  19646313  35819955  51775100
-regional  438676  5674635  22488737  48211021  61033324
- local  524997  6184752  22571873  51975471  75530399
Education  679703  6968581  27528711  56700424  84097340
-federal  229700  1356400  5487311  9023343  12231344
-regional  98249  1317678  5250503  11177017  15122035
- local  351753  4294503  16790897  36500064  56743961
Health  and  Sport  468953  5338754  19820376  38709964  57494614
- federal  52800  563000  2340921  3828008  5843945
- regional  133703  1611264  6620973  12935045  19014275
- local  282449  3164490  10858482  21946911  32636394
Social  Protection  204686  1265023  4775064  20850750  38791956
- federal  147000  657600  2403178  3864953  12104451
- regional  41819  441003  1666283  6487823  10377977
- local  15867  166420  705603  10497974  16309528
Administration  and  Justice  350326  3982490  18082220  39099609  61179795
- federal  282000  3171300  14712791  24654896  38965289
- regional  19264  241678  1121637  N/A  11649041
- local  49062  569512  2247792  N/A  10565465
Culture  and Mass  Media  115970  978755  4463105  9004354  13071548
- federal  59400  340300  1768418  2847969  4540463
- regional  24541  295580  1289253  2769236  3825785
- local  32030  342875  1405434  3387149  4705300
Defence  855000  7210000  28499629  49565077  76356954
- federal  855000  7210000  28499629  49565077  76356954
- regional  0  0  0  0  0
- local  0  0  0  0  0
Loans  957897  N/A  16629519  16169517  20113400
- federal  876300  2909600  14062395  9524891  6087923
- regional  38333  N/A  2071447  5591244  N/A
- local  43264  N/A  495677  1053382  N/A
OtherExpenditures  1157327  N/A  51444581  142383313  237243254
- federal  896400  11227900  35609255  126709659  222748811
- regional  98826  N/A  9248824  N/A  N/A
- local  162101  N/A  6586502  N/A  N/A
GDP  19000000  171500000  610700000  1630100000  220020000049
Notes:
1. The category  "Administration  and Justice"  sums  the data from "State  administration"  and "Law
enforcement"  expenditure  classifications.
2. The category  "Other  Expenditures"  is formed  as the difference  between  "Total  Expenditures"  and the
sum of all itemized  expenditures  shown in the above  table.
3. The 1993  figures of the category  "Administration  and Justice"  do not include  data on law enforcement
expenditures  on regional  and municipal  level.
4. The 1993  figure of the "Health  and Sport"  category  does not include  data on sport expenditures.
5. The 1992,  1993  and 1994  data on "Total  Expenditures"  on federal level have been augmented  with the
expenditures  from the following  off-budget  accounts:  "Foreign  Economic  Activity"  and "Road and
Ecological  funds".
6. Regional  and municipal  data for 1996  do not include  the expenditures  of a number  of "closed  cities",
which budgets  were not included  in the official  statistics  for previous  years.
7. "Total municipal  Expenditures"  is defined  as the sum of total expenditures  of municipalities  net of
transfers among  municipalities.
8. Due to the missing data,  the 1993  figures  on interbudgetary  transfers  were estimated  based  on the
revenue  side data other  municipalities,  adjusted  for measurement  errors.50
APPENDIX 3: Budget  Balance  by Level of Government
/ mln. current Rubles
Budget Balance / Year  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Consolidated Budget Balance  -3566233  -16180551  -56060038  -74042441  -184937086
- federal  -3906800  -18159800  -59874880  -68565257  -167422865
- consolidated  regional  340567  1979249  3814842  -5477184  -17514221
- regional  176320  1239635  1650022  -4615217  -14714754
- local  164246  739614  2164820  -861967  -2799467
GDP  19000000  171500000  610700000 1630100000 2200200000
APPENDIX  4: Budget Balance  before Transfers  by Level of Government
/ mln. current Rubles
Budget Balance / Year  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Consolidated Budget Balance  -3566233  -16180551  -56060038  -74042441  -184937086
- federal  -3639400  -13784900  -37869357  -34986496  -110738304
- consolidated  regional  73167  -2395651  -18190681  -39055945  -74198782
- regional  438482  N/A  506375  5973229  -5539541
- local  -270141  N/A  -14913148  -38821364  -62458986
GDP  19000000  171500000  610700000  1630100000 2200200000Policy Research Working Paper Series
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